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Introduction 
 
This paper aims to explore the extent to which national minorities in the Georgian provinces 
of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti are integrated into the economic and political life 
of Georgia and to investigate how government policy in the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution of November 2003 has affected the relationship between the state and minority 
communities in these two regions. It is divided into eight parts. First I provide a general 
overview of the main characteristics of the population of the two provinces in terms of 
ethnicity and language use. The second part turns to the economy of the two regions, 
focusing on both agricultural and industrial production. The next section turns to state-
society relations by showing how government policy in the fields of education, local 
government, infrastructure and economic development has impacted upon the integration of 
national minorities in the two provinces. The fourth section explores in greater depth the 
modes of local governance in the two municipalities of Samtskhe-Javakheti (Akhalkalaki 
and Ninotsminda, collectively known as Javakheti) and the five municipalities of Kvemo 
Kartli (Gardabani, Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and Tsalka) in which members of national 
minorities are concentrated, by identifying the main power brokers in these municipalities 
and by looking at how local power structures have changed in the last five years. The 
following part focuses on the process of migration and includes both permanent migration of 
Georgians and members of national minorities within Georgia and to destinations beyond the 
country's borders, as well as seasonal migration abroad. The sixth part deals with the issue of 
land distribution, which has been a contentious one in both provinces. The seventh section is 
the final substantive part of the paper; it takes the “view from below” by looking at the most 
salient issues from the point of view of members of national minorities that live in the two 
provinces. The paper then closes with a short conclusion. 
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1. Demographic Overview 
 
Table 1 Ethnic Composition of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti Provinces 
PROVINCE/DISTRICT Georgians Azeris Armenians Greeks Others 
Kvemo Kartli 44.71% 45.14% 6.39% 1.49% 2.27% 
Rustavi city 87.77% 4.29% 2.41% 0.22% 5.30% 
Gardabani 53.20% 43.72% 0.93% 0.21% 1.95% 
Marneuli 8.04% 83.10% 7.89% 0.33% 0.63% 
Bolnisi 26.82% 65.98% 5.81% 0.59% 0.80% 
Dmanisi 31.24% 66.76% 0.52% 0.78% 0.69% 
Tetritskaro 74.03% 6.47% 10.38% 5.05% 4.07% 
Tsalka 12.02% 9.54% 54.98% 21.97% 1.50% 
Samstkhe-Javakheti 43.35% 0.03% 54.60% 0.36% 1.67% 
Borjomi 84.21% 0.07% 9.64% 1.67% 4.42% 
Akhaltsikhe 61.72% 0.03% 36.59% 0.28% 1.39% 
Adigeni 95.70% 0.08% 3.36% 0.03% 0.82% 
Aspindza 82.02% 0.00% 17.47% 0.06% 0.45% 
Akhalkalaki 5.27% 0.00% 94.33% 0.08% 0.31% 
Ninotsminda 1.39% 0.01% 95.78% 0.01% 2.81% 
 
The two provinces of Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli in southern and southeastern 
Georgia respectively are the only two of Georgia's nine provinces (mkhareebi) in which 
members of national minorities make up a majority of the population of the territory. 
According to the 2002 census, fifty-five percent of the total population of Georgia's 
minorities were concentrated in these two provinces if we exclude from our calculations 
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those territories of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in which the census 
could not be carried out. In Samtskhe-Javakheti, the main minority is the Armenian minority, 
which makes up more than 90% of the population of two districts, Akhalkalaki and 
Ninotsminda (collectively known as Javakheti). In Kvemo Kartli, the principal minority is 
the Azeri minority; Azeris make up a majority of the population in Marneuli, Bolnisi and 
Dmanisi municipalities and over 40% of inhabitants in Gardabani municipality. There is also 
a large Armenian minority in Tsalka district (making up around 55% of the population) and a 
(fast disappearing) population of Greeks. The ethnic composition of all municipalities of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli, based on the population census of 2002, is shown in 
Table 1 above. The figure of 21.97% shown above for the Greek population of Tsalka 
municipality no longer represents reality. Most Greeks who were living in this municipality 
have since emigrated (mainly to Greece) and the true figure in 2009 is likely to be below five 
percent. Similarly, the percentage of Georgians living in Tsalka municipality is likely to be 
much higher (possibly as high as 40%) due to in-migration of Georgians from the 
mountainous districts of Adjara (especially Khulo) and from the mountainous northern 
region of Svaneti. 
In terms of smaller minorities (subsumed under the category “others” in Table 1), the most 
significant are Russians, who make up 3.06% of the population of Rustavi city, 2.75% in 
Ninotsminda and 2.72% in Tetritskaro. In Ninotsminda, most Russians are Dukhobors, 
religious dissidents who resettled to the area from Russia in the mid-nineteenth century 
(Lohm 2006). Finally, Ossetians make up 2.22% of the population in Borjomi district. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many members of national minorities remained 
poorly integrated in the social and political life of the new republic of Georgia due to their 
lack of knowledge of Georgian, which was now the only official language on Georgian 
territory (except in the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, where the Georgian constitution 
also grants Abkhaz the status of an official language). According to the 2002 census, only 
31% of persons belonging to national minorities in Georgia are able to speak Georgian 
fluently.1 Moreover, fluency in Georgian amongst minorities is concentrated in the capital 
city and other regions of the country where there is a mixed population, while fluency in 
more remote regions with monoethnic minority populations is far lower. A survey carried out 
 
1 Source: Sakartvelos Statistikis Sakhelmts’ipo Departamenti, Sakartvelos Mosakhleobis 2002 Ts’lis Pireveli 
Erovnuli Saqoveltao Aghts’eris Shedegebi. 
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by ECMI in May 2008 that included 1699 minority respondents from eight municipalities of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli showed that only in the municipalities of Borjomi and 
Akhaltsikhe, where the ethnic Georgian population is relatively high (see Table 1), were 
more than 10% of theminority population fully fluent in Georgian. The breakdown according 
to municipality is shown in Tables 2a and 2b (below). 
Table 2a Fluency in Georgian amongst minorities in four districts of Samtskhe-
Javakheti2 
Level of Georgian Borjomi Akhaltsikhe Akhalkalaki Ninotsminda 
No knowledge 0.0% 6.7% 47.2% 28.2% 
Can only understand a few 
basic words 
 
11.9% 
 
28.9% 
 
30.3% 
 
52.6% 
Can understand nearly 
everything but can express only 
basic needs verbally 
 
4.8% 
 
37.0% 
 
16.5% 
 
14.1% 
Can understand and speak well 
but cannot write 
 
11.9% 
 
3.7% 
 
0.8% 
 
1.3% 
Can understand, speak and 
write fluently 
 
71.4% 
 
23.7% 
 
5.1% 
 
3.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Included 254 minority respondents sampled randomly from Akhalkalaki district, 156 from Ninotsminda 
district, 135 from Akhaltsikhe district and 42 from Borjomi district. 
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Table 2b Fluency in Georgian amongst minorities in four districts of Kvemo Kartli3 
Level of Georgian Gardabani Marneuli Dmanisi Tsalka 
No knowledge 24.5% 42.2% 8.1% 19.3% 
Can only understand a few 
basic words 
 
47.0% 
 
35.1% 
 
47.5% 
 
49.5% 
Can understand nearly 
everything but can express only 
basic needs verbally 
 
14.0% 
 
12.8% 
 
32.3% 
 
22.6% 
Can understand and speak well 
but cannot write 
 
6.9% 
 
6.2% 
 
7.1% 
 
2.8% 
Can understand, speak and 
write fluently 
 
7.7% 
 
3.8% 
 
5.1% 
 
5.7% 
 
2. Economy 
 
Increases in the economic output of both Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti have failed 
to keep up with the rapid growth of the economy in the capital city, Tbilisi. This is a 
reflection of a more general trend observed throughout most of the first decade of the twenty-
first century in which an economic boom has occurred in the capital, but rural areas have 
failed to keep up. In 2007, annual turnover per capita in Kvemo Kartli stood at 59.7% of the 
national average, compared with 67.6% in 2003. In Samtskhe-Javakheti, the corresponding 
figures are 22.0% and 35.5%. A similar picture emerges when we consider production value 
per capita; this has fallen from 92.1% to 89.9% of the national average in the four years 
between 2003 and 2007 in Kvemo Kartli and from 47.9% to 25.7% in Samtskhe-Javakheti. If 
we rank eleven regions of Georgia (the nine rural provinces, the city of Tbilisi and the 
autonomous republic of Adjara) according to these two indicators, we see that Kvemo Kartli 
has maintained third place during the four-year period, behind Tbilisi and Adjara, while 
Samtskhe-Javakheti has held on to eighth place (above only Guria, Kakheti and Racha-
Lechkhumi/Kvemo Svaneti, Department of Statistics 2008a). Given the fact that the overall 
income in Samtskhe-Javakheti is boosted by industrial enterprises such as Georgia Glass and 
Mineral Waters Company (see below) in predominantly Georgian areas of the province, we 
would expect that both turnover and production per capita in the predominantly Armenian 
                                                 
3 Included 422 minority respondents sampled randomly from Marneuli district, 379 from Gardabani district, 
212 from Tsalka district and 99 from Dmanisi district. 
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districts of Aklhalkalaki and Ninotsminda (collectively known as Javakheti) would be 
amongst the lowest in the country. 
Both Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli are predominantly agricultural regions. Both are 
prime potato-growing areas and between them produce more than half of Georgia's potato 
crop. According to the State Department for Statistics, almost 110,000 tonnes of potatoes 
were produced in Samtskhe-Javakheti in 2007, which made up 37.4% of all potatoes 
produced in Georgia. In Kvemo Kartli, 60,000 tonnes were produced (20.5% of the total). 
Most of the potatoes are grown in highland areas of the two provinces, especially in 
Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda, Aspindza, Dmanisi, Tetritskaro and Tsalka districts. Other 
vegetables, such as tomatoes, cabbage, and cauliflower, as well as a wide range of fruits, 
grow in the lower lying areas of Kvemo Kartli, especially Gardabani and Marneuli districts. 
Vegetable production in Kvemo Kartli made up 79,500 tonnes in 2007, over 40% of the total 
vegetable production in Georgia (Department of Statistics 2008b). However, production of all 
vegetables, including potatoes has been falling throughout Georgia in recent years, reducing 
the overall income for both Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. In addition to potatoes 
and other vegetables, maize and wheat are also grown in the lower-lying areas of Kvemo 
Kartli. 
Livestock production also makes up a significant part of agricultural output in both Kvemo 
Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. Cattle and sheep breeding are widespread in both provinces, 
especially in highland regions of Kvemo Kartli, where hayfields make up a large part of 
agricultural land. Recently there has also been a very rapid rise in egg production in Kvemo 
Kartli; by 2007 Kvemo Kartli produced 57.5% of Georgia's eggs, compared with just 14.7% 
in 2003 (Department of Statistics 2008b).  
Industrial production in both Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti is concentrated in a very 
few enterprises. In Kvemo Kartli, these are the Rustavi Steel Works, the Rustavi Chemical 
Plant (which produces chemical fertilisers), Heidelberg Cement in Rustavi and the Madneuli 
gold and copper mines at Kazreti in Bolnisi district. Following the privatization of these 
enterprises in 2005-2006, they increased their production significantly and together they 
account for most of Georgia's export capacity. By 2007, the output of industrial production 
per capita in Kvemo Kartli was more than double that of the national average. However, 
these enterprises proved highly vulnerable to vicissitudes in the world market and Rustavi 
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Steel was forced to suspend production in late 2008 and shed nearly a quarter of its staff as 
the world economic slowdown cut demand for Georgian steel. It is also worthy of note that 
with the exception of Madneuli, these enterprises are concentrated in Rustavi, where few 
members of national minorities live. 
In Samtskhe-Javakheti, the main industrial enterprise is Georgia Glass and Mineral Waters 
Company, which produces Georgia's best known mineral waters. However, its location in 
Borjomi, where the vast majority of the population are ethnic Georgians (see Table 1), means 
that it provides little by way of employment for national minorities. There are very few 
enterprises in Javakheti, although a recent exception is the establishment of a garment 
factory in Ninotsminda by a local businessman who has spent several years in Russia (see 
below). Overall, in 2007 the output of industrial production per capita in Samtskhe-Javakheti 
was less than half of the national average. 
3. State Society Relations: Government Policy towards Samtskhe-
Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli 
 
During the leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze the Georgian state did not intervene directly 
in the everyday affairs of citizens in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. However, 
individual state officials derived most of their income from corruption, which blighted the 
lives of those citizens that needed to make bureaucratic transactions in order to obtain a 
passport, start a business or obtain the paltry benefits (such as pensions) that the state 
provided. Moreover, the weak infrastructural power of the state during the Shevardnadze 
period meant that it was not possible to promote knowledge of the state language, Georgian, 
amongst members of national minorities. For this reason, knowledge of Georgian in areas in 
which minorities were geographically concentrated remained very poor. This impeded the 
creation of a “demos” to which all citizens, Georgian or otherwise, could feel they belonged. 
The language barrier increasingly became a barrier to communication between Georgian and 
minority groups, especially amongst young people, as Russian began to lose its role as the 
language of inter-ethnic communication. The youth—especially the Georgian youth—could 
no longer speak Russian fluently enough to communicate. Programmes to teach Georgian to 
ethnic minorities were half-hearted, mainly due to the state’s incapacity to implement its 
education policy. Declining infrastructure rendered communication even more complex, and 
poor provision of public goods further undermined prospects for integration. School 
buildings collapsed and some regions―especially Javakheti and Tsalka district―became 
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virtually cut off from the rest of the country as the parlous state of the roads made journeys 
to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, arduous. In terms of the provision of public goods, regions in 
which minorities were concentrated were not necessarily worse off than other remote rural 
districts, but linguistic barriers reinforced a sense of isolation and neglect.  
In Javakheti during the Shevardnadze period the Georgian state failed to provide public 
goods to the local population, but in many ways the 62nd Divisional Russian base located in 
the town of Akhalkalaki stepped in to fill this gap. This military base provided employment 
and a source of living to many local families. The presence of the base meant that the 
currency circulating in the region was the Russian ruble, rather than the Georgian lari (GEL), 
which further distanced Javakheti from the rest of Georgia. The base also provided 
psychological reassurance as a guarantee of defence against neighbouring Turkey.4 Plans by 
the Georgian government to close the base were therefore fiercely resisted by the local 
population. 
In terms of how the state appointed officials to the local administration in Kvemo Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti, significant differences existed between the two regions. The key post at 
the level of the province was (and still is) that of governor, appointed by the president and 
occupied by an individual with close links to him. All provincial governors were (and still 
are) ethnic Georgians. However, differences arose at district (rayon) level5, where the key 
posts of district administrator (gamgebeli), chief of the district police, prosecutor, head of the 
district tax inspectorate and chief of the district education board were all appointed by the 
centre. In the two districts of Javakheti (Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda), where Armenians 
made up a majority, all these posts were held by Armenians who had been co-opted by the 
centre. Typically, the most influential individuals in these two districts were Armenian 
businessmen who had profited from Georgia’s status as a “neutral” state in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict to engage in the trade of oil and gas between Azerbaijan and Armenia 
(Wheatley 2004). However, these leaders could not been seen as representatives of their 
populations as they tended to pursue private (financial) goals, rather than serve the interests 
of the communities they supposedly represented. 
In Kvemo Kartli, on the other hand, the Azeri population was barely represented in state 
 
4  The Armenian population of Javakheti frequently refer to what they term the Armenian genocide, i.e. the 
large scale massacre of Armenians by Turkish Ottoman troops during the First World War. 
5 After the new Organic Law on Georgia on Local Self-Government was adopted in December 2005, districts 
(rayoni) were referred to as municipalities. 
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structures at all. In the late 1980s, most Azeris holding top positions in local power structures 
were removed from their posts as a result of the new mood of ethnic nationalism that had 
swept the country. During Shevardnadze’s term as president (1995–2003), all district 
gamgeblebi in Kvemo Kartli were Georgians (unlike in Javakheti, where these posts were 
held by Armenians) and virtually all other senior posts at rayon level were also held by 
Georgians. Local Azeri leaders were given minor posts but, more importantly, were allowed 
to engage in corruption in return for their loyalty to Kvemo Kartli’s powerful governor, 
Levan Mamaladze. As a result, there were few mechanisms for the local Azeri population to 
express their grievances, the most pressing of which was corruption in the process of land 
distribution following the dissolution of the communist-era collective farms (sovkhozes and 
kolkhozes). Much of the land that had formerly belonged to sovkhozes and kolkhozes was 
leased out in a non-transparent manner. Very often the bulk of this land was rented by “local 
notables”, typically former sovkhoz or kolkhoz directors or individuals with close personal 
links to members of the local administration. Most—although not all—of these individuals 
were Georgians. This added to the impression amongst many local Azeris that they were 
second-class citizens who did not really belong in the Georgian state.  
Since the so-called Rose Revolution of November 2003 and the subsequent election of 
Mikheil Saakashvili as president of Georgia, the government has made significant efforts to 
integrate non-Georgian populations into Georgian public life. During the Saakashvili 
administration the following trends have been observed with respect to the integration of 
national minorities: greater emphasis on teaching Georgian in schools where national 
minorities are concentrated, often with the assistance of international donors such as the 
OSCE; promises to improve the basic infrastructure in areas where national minorities are 
concentrated, including a promise to rehabilitate the roads linking Akhalkalaki and 
Ninotsminda to other Georgian cities with the help of the US-funded Millennium Challenge; 
the establishment of a school of public administration, named after the late prime minister 
Zurab Zhvania, aimed at recruiting members of national minorities to work in the civil 
service; the establishment of youth camps called “patriot camps” aimed at bringing together 
young people from different ethnic backgrounds; and the ratification of the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which came into 
force in April  2006. 
Of particular importance for ordinary citizens of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti is 
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the drive by the Georgian government to teach the state language to members of national 
minorities that lack mastery of Georgian and the overall standardization of the education 
system. According to the Law on General Education, passed in 2005, Georgian language and 
literature, the history and geography of Georgia as well as “other social sciences” would be 
taught in Georgian as part of the national curriculum by the academic year 2010 at the latest. 
Moreover, the national entrance examinations that were introduced in 2005 for entry into 
Georgia's state accredited universities required that students achieve a basic pass mark in 
Georgian language and literature in order to be eligible for university.  
Although these moves marked a genuine effort on the part of the government to engage 
members of national minorities in public life, the short time-scale in which these measures 
were introduced appeared rather unrealistic given the low level of competence in Georgian of 
many members of national minorities. The rapid introduction of examinations in the 
Georgian language with a minimum of preparation, may have had a contrary effect to that 
which was intended as university applicants from regions such as Kvemo Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti in which minorities are concentrated are in effect unable to go to 
Georgian universities and continue to follow the time-honoured practice of going to Yerevan 
and Baku to study. In 2005, the first year in which these examinations were introduced, just 
two out of sixty-four non-Georgian students from Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts 
passed the examinations and entered state-credited universities. In 2008, numbers remained 
in single figures; although more Armenian students achieved the bare minimum mark 
necessary to pass, marks in Georgian dragged down their overall average and prevented them 
from getting through the tough competition for entry into Georgia's universities. This state of 
affairs was further exacerbated by the closure of the Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi state 
university. 
Another major step taken by the government in the field of education is the provision of text 
books in core curriculum subjects translated into minority languages. This was first 
introduced by the Ministry of Education in the academic year 2007-08, when books were 
provided for the first, seventh and tenth years of schooling. In the academic year 2008-09, 
books were also made available for second, eighth and eleventh year pupils. In the next 
several years these translated text books are expected to become available for all school 
years. Previously all books for national minorities had come from Yerevan or Baku, except 
for Georgian language books on the history and geography of Georgia. The new books 
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therefore mark a significant step towards the standardization of education across the country. 
Although there have been some complaints of mistranslations and inaccuracies in the 
translation,6 most minority stakeholders in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti have 
registered their approval of the initiative. 
Another sphere in which the state has made a significant impact on public life is in 
improvements in infrastructure. The ongoing project to rehabilitate the transport 
infrastructure has already cut journey times in the more mountainous and remote 
municipalities of Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda and Tsalka and forthcoming road and rail 
building projects are likely to make further progress in this direction over the coming years. 
Most of the road between Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki has already been rehabilitated, 
cutting journey times from Tbilisi to Akhalkalaki from over six hours to around four-and-a-
half. Another major project, funded by the US Millennium Challenge, is to reconstruct the 
highway from Tbilisi through Tsalka in Kvemo Kartli to Ninotsminda, which is expected to 
be completed in 2011. This will not only reduce travel times still further between Tbilisi and 
Javakheti, but will also improve the transport infrastructure in Tsalka, which has been very 
poor until now. Improvements have already been made to the first section of the road 
between Tbilisi and Manglisi in Tetritskaro district and travel times between Tbilisi and 
Tsalka have already been cut from around three hours in 2004 to two hours in 2009. Another 
major project that is already underway is the building of a railway from the city of Kars in 
eastern Turkey, through Akhalkalaki and on to Tbilisi and eventually Baku. This project, 
which was agreed by the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey in early 2007 is also 
expected to be completed in 2011. 
As well as the transport infrastructure, the Georgian government has also made 
improvements to the infrastructure in other spheres. In many areas schools have been 
repaired and computers are now provided in most, if not all, schools. In schools in the town 
of Akhalkalaki, each child has access to one computer, although the number of computers 
available in village schools is rather less. Schools now have a budget7 and teachers are paid 
their salaries on time. This represents a significant improvement in comparison with the 
 
6 Including one textbook made available to Armenian communities in Akhalkalaki district that contained 
about 20 pages in the middle in the Azeri language. 
7 In one school in Akhalkalaki, teachers reported in April 2009 that the budget was equivalent to GEL 550 
(approx EUR 330) per pupil, but this had to cover teachers' salaries as well as heating the building. The 
school in question had some money left over in the 2008 budget to pay for free books for students, but as a 
result of rising heating costs there were fears that this would not be possible in 2009. 
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situation in 2004, although there is room for much further improvement as many schools 
remain in a poor state of repair and are inadequately heated in winter. In 2009, the Georgian 
government allotted around GEL 20 million for its new Village Support Programme. The aim 
of the programme is to solve the most urgent infrastructural problems in rural communities 
as defined by the villagers themselves. In many communities (for example in Akhalkalaki 
municipality) the project adopted the methodologies used by international aid organizations, 
whereby villages would elect a board of community members who would organize the 
project and administer the funds. The government would supply the materials, while 
villagers would supply the labour. The population of the villages in Bolnisi municipality 
were allocated GEL 476,903, Tsalka municipality GEL 219,723, Dmanisi GEL 266,220, 
Gardabani GEL 681,771, Tetritskaro GEL 271,595, Marneuli GEL 781,322 and Akhalkalaki 
approximately GEL 500,000. Data is not available for other municipalities.8 
The Georgian government has also begun supplying gas to the towns and villages of Kvemo 
Kartli and has contracted out the supply of natural gas for households to private companies. 
According to the then governor of Kvemo Kartli, David Kirkitadze, four villages in Marneuli 
district were connected to the gas supply network in October 2008.9 Kirkitadze also pledged 
to bring gas to households in Tsalka district, where only a few public buildings in the main 
town of Tsalka are connected. In late 2008, the Georgian government handed over the local 
distribution companies to the Azeri gas supplier, SOCAR. Most of the major towns as well as 
a number of villages now receive natural gas from this supplier. Gas has also been piped to 
Akhalkalaki, but distribution is in the hands of a private company that charges GEL 400 
(EUR 240) to connect dwellings to the gas supply, a price that many households cannot 
afford. By April 2009, around 600 households had been connected to the gas supply in the 
town of Akhalkalaki and the government was planning to pipe the gas also to the villages of 
Javakheti. 
Finally, the supply of electricity to rural areas of Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti has 
improved significantly since 2004, with most areas receiving 24-hour electricity for most of 
the time. Outages still occur as a result of the poor state of repair of the electricity 
distribution system, although the main energy distributor, Energy-Pro Georgia, which 
 
8 “Village Support Program”, Kvemo Kartli Independent Media, at 
http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/articles.php?id=77; interviews with the author. 
9 “David Kirkitadze Demands the Region to be Gasified at Best”. Kvemo Kartli Independent Media: News,  
(28 October 2008), at http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/reginfo.php. 
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provides electricity to around two-thirds of homes in Georgia, has been rehabilitating the 
electricity distribution network in Bolnisi and Tetritskaro municipalities in Kvemo Kartli.10 
Greater effectiveness of state institutions in Georgia as a whole has led to improved tax 
collection, which in turn has led to the state being able to significantly increase transfers of 
funds to the regions. As a result, the regional budget in most districts has increased 
significantly. Thus, the budget of Akhalkalaki district municipality has grown from GEL 
700,000 (EUR 425,000) in 2005 to GEL 9 million (EUR 5.5 million) in 2009.11 This has 
allowed the municipalities to devote funds to essential infrastructure repairs such as repairing 
roads, bridges and drainage systems and ensuring a supply of potable water. 
Despite the improvement in the local infrastructure and the greater resources available for 
local budgets, the development of the local economy has not improved significantly since 
2004 either in Samtskhe-Javakheti or in most of Kvemo Kartli. Notwithstanding increases in 
production of Rustavi's main industries, as well as Georgia Glass and Mineral Waters 
Company in Borjomi and the gold and copper mines in Kazreti, there are virtually no 
enterprises in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti except for these entities. As we 
observed above, output per capita in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti actually fell back 
with respect to the national average between 2003 and 2007 and economic activity in most of 
these regions is confined to the sale of imported products such as bottled gas and consumer 
goods. Agriculture remains primarily a subsistence activity and few small or medium-sized 
enterprises exist, despite a pledge made by President Saakashvili in July 2007 to create more 
than a hundred new agricultural processing enterprises.12 There is no evidence that this 
project has got off the ground in either of the two regions analysed in this paper. Similarly a 
promise made by the Georgian Ministry of Defence that the Georgian army would buy up a 
significant part of the agricultural production of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts to 
compensate for the withdrawal of the Russian military base (effectuated in 2007) also 
appears to have come to nothing.13  
 
10 See Kvemo Kartli Independent Media: News (,13 April 2009 and 11 June 2009), at 
http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/reginfo.php. 
11 Interview with the gamgebeli of Akhalkalaki, Nair Iritsyan, 14 April 2009. 
12 Civil Georgia: Online Magazine (25th July 2007) at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=15494. 
13 Civil Georgia: Online Magazine (10th August 2005) at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10516; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark: The Neighbourhood Programme, "Denmark’s Caucasus 
Programme 2005 – 2007: Interventions by the European Centre for Minority Issues" at 
http://www.um.dk/NR/rdonlyres/198301C0-3CFF-4AA0-AA32-
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In terms of the appointments of personnel to official posts in the local administration of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli little change can be observed with respect to the 
Shevardnadze period. In Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda municipalities, the principle of co-
optation still prevails; top posts are still divvied out to influential Armenians who were 
prominent during the Shevardnadze period or even earlier (see below). Overall, the key posts 
at district level, such as the gamgebeli, the chief of police, the prosecutor and the chief 
justice, are Armenians in Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts. Most school directors are 
also Armenians, although most―not having passed the required Georgian language 
assessments―now hold the title of “acting director”. In Kvemo Kartli, on the other hand, 
including in those districts in which national minorities make up the majority, all the key 
posts are held by Georgians, just as they were during the Shevardnadze period. Typically, in 
those municipalities in which Azeris make up the majority of the population, namely 
Marneuli, Dmanisi and Bolnisi, a deputy gamgebeli is Azeri and one or two members of staff 
at the district administration (gamgeoba), but the rest are Georgians.  
Even in the elected bodies at district level in Kvemo Kartli, the sakrebuloebi or councils, the 
numerical strength of ethnic Azeris is significantly lower than the proportion they make up of 
the population at large. Table 3 shows how Azeris are significantly under-represented in 
municipalities in which they make up a majority of the population; thus, in Dmanisi and 
Bolnisi municipalities, where Azeris make up around two-thirds of the population, they only 
make up a minority of councillors. Similarly in Marneuli municipality, Azeris only make up 
just over half the number of councillors even though they make up over 80% of the 
population (compare with Table 1). Minorities were particularly underrepresented amongst 
those elected by party list of the ruling United National Movement (UNM) in the local 
elections of 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3127C7852897/0/NABECMICaucasusProgramme200607final.doc. 
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Table 3 Representation of nationalities in the sakrebuloebi of Kvemo-Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti14 
PROVINCE/DISTRICT Georgians Azeris Armenians Greeks Others 
Kvemo Kartli 59.41% 28.22% 9.90% 0.99% 1.49% 
Rustavi city 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Gardabani 59.38% 41.62% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Marneuli 31.03% 55.17% 10.34% 0.00% 0.00% 
Bolnisi 57.69% 38.46% 3.85% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dmanisi 57.69% 38.46% 0.00% 0.00% 3.85% 
Tetritskaro 82.35% 8.82% 10.38% 2.94% 2.94% 
Tsalka 47.50% 12.50% 37.50% 2.50% 0.00% 
Samtskhe-Javakheti 59.59% 0.00% 39.73% 0.00% 0.68% 
Borjomi 95.24% 0.00% 4.76% 0.00% 0.00% 
Akhaltsikhe 69.23% 0.00% 30.77% 0.00% 0.00% 
Adigeni 92.00% 0.00% 8.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Aspindza 95.45% 0.00% 4.55% 0.00% 0.00% 
Akhalkalaki 12.50% 0.00% 87.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
Ninotsminda 5.00% 0.00% 90.00% 0.00% 5.00% 
 
It is also worthy of note that the system of appointment of gamgeblebi continues to ensure 
strict central control, not only in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti, but also in many 
other regions of Georgia. On paper, the new Organic Law of Georgia on Local Self-
Government, adopted in December 2005, gave more power to the sakrebuloebi and its 
chairperson at municipality level, stipulating as it did that the gamgeoba is there to 
                                                 
14 Research carried out by ECMI; Central Election Commission of Georgia at 
http://cec.gov.ge/uploads/attachments_old/209_2269_892400_MEMBERSOFSAKREBULOELECTEDTH
ROUGHPROPORTIONALSYSTEM.doc and 
http://cec.gov.ge/uploads/attachments_old/209_2269_947315_MEMBERSOFSAKREBULOELECTEDTH
ROUGHMAJORITARIANSYSTEM.doc. 
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implement the decisions of the sakrebulo and that the head of the executive (or gamgebeli) 
was to be appointed by the sakrebulo through a process of competitive tender. According to 
the Law, the gamgebeli was to be accountable to the sakrebulo, which would determine his 
or her salary and working conditions. Previously the gamgebeli was formally subordinate 
only to the president. 
However, in reality it would appear that powerful figures within the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs15 in Tbilisi or the governor's office in the main city of the province have exerted 
significant behind-the-scenes influence to ensure that their own approved candidates become 
gamgebeli. This appears to be the state of affairs across Georgia, where central control is 
reinforced by the fact that Saakashvili's United National Movement (UNM) won an absolute 
majority in councils of all Georgian municipalities in the local elections of October 2006. 
The highly centralized UNM was therefore able to determine who could sit as gamgebeli in 
all municipalities, meaning that the change in the law had little or no impact on the way 
power is exercised in Georgia's regions. In Kvemo Kartli, the centre appears to have 
exercised an even higher degree of control than elsewhere over the appointment of 
gamgeblebi; stakeholders in Marneuli report that the sakrebulo virtually ceased to function 
once the gamgebeli was appointed and that the gamgebeli was the choice of the governor's 
office in Rustavi. In Akhalakalaki municipality, the bureau of the sakrebulo had a number of 
candidates for gamgebeli from which to choose on the two occasions in which the gamgebeli 
was replaced in 2008 (see below), but it is also reported that the governor's office in 
Akhaltsikhe exerted significant influence over who was selected. Overall, therefore, the new 
Organic Law of Georgia on Local Self-Government has had little impact on the dynamic of 
power at local level either in Kvemo Kartli or in Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
The main change brought about by the new Organic Law of Georgia on Local Self-
Government was the way governance worked at community level. The new law abolished 
the bodies of local self-government at the level of the community (temi in Georgian, 
signifying either a single village or a cluster of several villages). Instead of electing its own 
council or sakrebulo, each community would instead directly elect one representative to the 
 
15 After the Ministry of Internal Affairs subsumed Georgia's intelligence services in late 2004, it gained 
unprecedented power over all matters of state and became particularly active in regions in which national 
minorities are concentrated due to the perceived threat of separatism. Vano Merabishvili, the Minister of 
Internal Affairs, is very close to President Saakashvili and is far more influential than any other minister. It 
is widely believed that Merabishvili and his deputies have considerable say over who is appointed to key 
positions in minority regions. 
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sakrebulo of the municipality and it was the role of this elected representative to represent 
the interests of the community in the sakrebulo of the municipality. At the same time the 
executive branch of government at the level of the community, the gamgeoba, would appoint 
a trustee to each community and sometimes also a specialist in each individual village. There 
was thus a parallel system in which each community would have an elected representative as 
well as a representative of the gamgeoba of the municipality. Most respondents from both 
Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti reported that the representative of the gamgeoba was 
the dominant position of the two. This is not surprising; the sakrebulo does not run the 
municipality on a day to day basis; how to organize and how to spend the local budget is the 
responsibility of the the gamgeoba and its representatives. 
Some changes can be observed to the way school directors are appointed, although a degree 
of centralization still persists, especially in certain municipalities. According to the Law on 
General Education, adopted in 2005, school directors are to be elected by a board of trustees 
made up of parents, teachers and one pupil. The first school directors were selected by means 
of this system in July 2007, but the new system does not yet appear to have been fully 
implemented in Kvemo Kartli. According to respondents of interviews in Marneuli, the 
system of appointment of school directors in Kvemo Kartli remains highly centralized. Most 
directors of Azeri schools were appointed by the centre many years ago and have still not 
been replaced. So far there has been no occasion in which schools in Marneuli or Bolnisi 
districts have been able to elect their own director. According to a number of observers, a 
school in a village in Bolnisi district attempted to do so but their choice of candidate was 
rejected by the Ministry of Education who explained that until October 2009 it would be the 
Ministry of Education who appointed the school director. This would appear to run counter 
to the provisions laid down by law.16 In Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda municipalities, almost 
all of the old school directors failed to pass the new qualification examinations held in 
January 2007 as a result of poor knowledge of the Georgian language; only two directors out 
of 150 passed the exam, although most stayed on as acting directors until they had the 
chance to resit the examinations (now scheduled for late 2009). On the few occasions in 
which ethnic Georgian candidates were nominated by the Ministry of Education and Science 
to replace the old directors they were rejected by the board of trustees, indicating that the 
boards do have some real powers. 
 
16 Interviews with the author. 
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One tendency that has been observed in recent years in both Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-
Javakheti is towards greater coercive control by the state. In particular, the influence of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs has become increasingly pervasive. In Javakheti (Akhalkalaki 
and Ninotsminda districts), the security services of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have on a 
number of occasions questioned leaders of NGOs and other civic activists in an attempt to 
unearth conspiracies against the Georgian state. Their enhanced presence there is often 
ascribed to the fact that the Minister of Internal Affairs, Vano Merabishvili, and his powerful 
deputy, Amiran Meskheli, are both from Akhaltsikhe and both are believed to be personally 
involved in day to day decision-making, especially in the two municipalities of Javakheti. 
Local observers claim that Akhalkalaki District Branch of the Provincial Office of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs is used as the provincial hub for intelligence gathering and 
routinely refer to the staff of the Office as “KGB”.17 This reflects the Georgian government's 
heightened security concerns about events in Javakheti. The police presence is noteworthy in 
other districts too; in Tsalka municipality, where the near absence of law enforcement 
agencies may well have been a contributory factor to a series of violent incidents that 
occurred there in 2005 (Wheatley 2006), the police presence has increased steadily since 
then. 
4. Local Actors 
 
Local actors have far more influence in those areas of Samtskhe-Javakheti where the 
Armenian minority is concentrated (most notably Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda 
municipalities, which are collectively known as Javakheti) than in areas of Kvemo Kartli 
where the Azeri minority is concentrated (such as Marneuli, Dmanisi and Bolnisi districts). 
In Tsalka district, where a number of national minorities have co-existed for a long period, 
local elites predominated until around 2005-2006, when the centre began to exert much 
greater control and undermined their influence. 
Javakheti 
In Javakheti since the mid 1990s, power at local level has been concentrated in the hands of a 
number of strategic economic groups, commonly known as clans (Wheatley 2004). These 
'clans' were led by powerful local families who had accumulated wealth either as Soviet-era 
 
17 Interviews with the author. In 2004, the Ministry for State Security (former KGB) was subsumed by the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and security activities are now distributed between different 
departments of the MoIA. 
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entrepreneurs18 or through the opportunities the collapse of the USSR had brought in terms 
of the possibility to trade goods such as basalt, oil and gas across the newly-established 
borders. During Shevardnadze's presidency, there were at least two such groups, both of 
which would periodically be favoured over others by top officials within the presidential 
administration, parliament or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Following the collapse of the 
ruling party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia, at the end of 2001 and the defection of the 
former chairman of parliament, Zurab Zhvania, to the opposition, one faction, led by 
individuals loyal to Shevardnadze, appeared to benefit at the expense of another group that 
was led by Zhvania's associates. 
Following the Rose Revolution, the pro-Shevardnadze faction was initially highly suspicious 
of the new leadership, but was soon brought on board following talks with Saakashvili's 
close ally Vano Merabishvili (later Minister of Internal Affairs and himself from 
Akhaltsikhe).19 The MP for Ninotsminda, Enzel Mkoyan, previously a staunch supporter of 
Shevardnadze, was made head of Saakashvili's election headquarters during the January 
2004 presidential elections and became an influential figure within Saakashvili's ruling party, 
the UNM. Despite the fact that Zurab Zhvania was made prime minister in 2004, the other 
main faction never managed to achieve hegemony in Javakheti and the influence of this 
faction declined further following Zhvania's untimely death in February 2005. 
Enzel Mkoyan probably remains the most influential individual in Javakheti today. 
Individuals believed to be close to him are said to control a significant part of Javakheti's 
economy. As member of parliament for Ninotsminda, he is frequently invited abroad as a 
member of various parliamentary delegations.20 Many of those close to him enjoy positions 
of prominence in both Ninotsminda and Akhalkalaki districts, including the chief of 
Ninotsminda police, a member of Ninotsminda municipality council (who is also one of 
Mkoyan's relatives), the director of Akhalkalaki resource centre, and the head of the district 
 
18 For example, one such family had run an iron enterprise and a gas-bottling factory during the Soviet period. 
Source: Rusiko Mumladze, “Clan-based Rule in Samtskhe-Javakheti”, Rezonansi, 27 March 2002. In 
Georgia especially the grey market during the late Soviet period allowed the directors of such enterprises to 
accrue significant private resources, despite the official ban on private enterprise. 
19 Tamar Asatiani, “Problems of a Ruling Party: ’Regional’”, 24 Hours (4th February 2005), at 
http://www.24hours.ge/index.php?n=188&r=8&id=694. 
20 Website of the Georgian Parliament, "Visit of David Bakradze, Speaker of Georgian Parliament and 
Parliamentary Delegation to US" (31st May 2009) at 
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=1132&info_id=2334; website of the Georgian 
Ministry of Justice, "Visit of the Georgia Delegation to Estonia is Completed" (4 October 2007) at 
http://www.justice.gov.ge/October,%202007.html. 
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 that Bdoyan voluntarily relinquished his position. 
of co-optation used by the centre to ensure the 
                                                
election commission of Ninotsminda municipality. The family of the latter is said to have 
significant influence over real estate deals in Javakheti, especially in the village of 
Gorelovka, until recently inhabited mainly by Russian Dukhobors (see below). Finally, in 
August 2007, Mkoyan's wife was made acting director of one of Akhalkalaki's main public 
schools in controversial circumstances, despite her lack of knowledge of the state 
language.   
In Ninotsminda, Mels Bdoyan, another former single-mandate MP of the same constituency 
who had been chairman of Ninotsminda district executive committee during the last days of 
communist rule, also sought to rebuild a power base there after being appointed gamgebeli of 
Ninotsminda in late 2004. Although only one party―the UNM―presented a list of 
candidates for the proportional part of the local elections of October 2006 (in Ninotsminda 
ten councillors were elected through party lists, while another ten were elected from small 
community-based constituencies based on the recently-abolished first or lowest level of local 
self-government, see below), this list was more or less evenly distributed amongst Mkoyan's 
faction, on the one hand, and Bdoyan's faction, on the other (Lohm 2007). Those elected 
directly from village level constituencies were also relatively equally divided. Although the 
newly-elected sakrebulo initially elected Bdoyan as chairman of the sakrebulo, Mkoyan's 
faction objected and with the help of the governor of Samtskhe-Javakheti and a number of 
other Georgian officials managed to ensure
Bdoyan was later arrested for corruption.  
Another influential figure is Samvel Petrosyan, the former leader of Javakh, the influential 
public movement that dominated Javakheti in the early 1990s when central state authority 
was weak or non-existent (Wheatley 2004; Lohm 2007). After Eduard Shevardnadze 
partially consolidated power in the mid-1990s he was assigned the post of deputy head of the 
local traffic police, but was later stripped of this position. However, Petrosyan was 
rehabilitated in the summer of 2006, when he was made chief of police of Akhalkalaki 
district. This further confirms the principle 
continued dominance of “loyal” Armenians. 
The gamgeblebi of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda are officially the heads of the executive 
branch of the two districts, but over the past fifteen years have tended to be representatives 
 
21 "Newly Appointed Director in Akhalkalaki does not Know the State Language" (22 August 2007) at 
http://www.humanrights.ge/index.php?a=article&id=1803&lang=en. 
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Javakheti could still only recognize 2.83 on average, compared with an average of 6.67 for 
                                                
of the main economic groups in the region. However, the current gamgebeli of Akhalkalaki, 
Nairi Iritsyan, appears to be a rather more independent figure, having previously been close 
to the political organization United Javakh and then being elected as co-chair of the umbrella 
organization for NGOs, the Javakheti Citizens Forum (see below). The gamgebeli has drawn 
from his NGO background to introduce a number of democratic innovations into the 
municipality. First of all, he has increased democratic control at village or community level 
over funds allotted by the Village Support Programme (see above), which amounted to GEL 
500,000 in 2009 (included in the overall budget for the municipality, see above) through the 
election of a board of community members to decide how funds from the programme should 
be administered. Another innovation launched by the current gamgebeli is the practice of 
holding popular elections for the post of specialist or trustee of the gamgeoba (municipality 
administration) at the level o
one candidate for the job.  
Given the “lock on power” held by the dominant factions in Javakheti and their backing from 
powerful figures within the Georgian authorities, it is difficult for outsiders to make many 
inroads into local power structures in Javakheti. In part this is due to lack of development of 
the economy of Javakheti, which means that there are very few activities that are financially 
lucrative in the region and these are almost always associated with the import and export of 
commodities such as oil and gas, which are under the almost full control of the dominant 
economic groups (Wheatley 2004). Some new actors, however, have be
“break into” the system over recent years, with varying degrees of success. 
Probably the least successful amongst these are opposition parties. Opposition parties based 
in Tbilisi have, over the past ten years, showed little if any interest in Javakheti, and the 
mainly Armenian population, lacking access to much of Georgia's media as a result of the 
language barrier, has little knowledge even of the existence of nationally-based opposition 
parties. According to a survey carried out by ECMI in May 2008, just two weeks before 
parliamentary elections, on average the non-Georgian population could only name 1.94 of 
the twelve parties and blocs competing in the elections, compared with an average of 4.01 
for ethnic Georgians in the provinces of Kakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
When prompted by being read the full list of twelve parties and blocs, non-Georgians in 
 
22 Interviews with the author. 
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ethnic Georgians in the three above-mentioned provinces.23 Believing (correctly) that the 
local population would vote en masse for the UNM, opposition parties did not even bother to 
campaign in Javakheti during the 2008 parliamentary elections. This further undermined 
their influence in the region. 
Over the past years, opposition parties have only been able to make headway in the region in 
local and national elections if powerful local factions have chosen to associate themselves 
with them. Thus, during the 1998 local elections  a local initiative group that was 
disillusioned with the local leadership of Eduard Shevardnadze's Citizens's Union of Georgia 
teamed up with the National Democratic party and garnered 19.45% of the vote in 
Akhalkalaki district and 26.56% in the town of Akhalkalaki (International Centre for Civic 
Culture 1999). Similarly in the disputed November 2003 parliamentary elections, the 
consequences of which brought about the Rose Revolution, the opposition electoral bloc 
“Burjanadze-Democrats”, led by Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze, received 23.36% of 
the vote in Akhalkalaki district due to the fact that one of the main local factions was close to 
Zhvania (see above). In the same elections, the leader of the unrecognized local party Virk 
(see below), Davit Rstakyan, allied himself with a national party, the New Rights and won 
just under 10% in both Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts. Finally, in the local elections 
of October 2006, the local movement United Javakh (see below) placed its candidates on the 
party list of “Industry Will Save Georgia” and as a result garnered 32.55% of the vote in 
Akhalkalaki municipality, the highest share of the vote any opposition party won in any 
district of Georgia. However, in the 2008 parliamentary elections, when no local group 
placed its candidates on the lists of a national opposition party, the ruling UNM won an 
overwhelming majority, picking up 90.21% of the vote in Akhalkalaki constituency and 
91.69% in Ninotsminda, compared with a national average of 59.18%.24 
In terms of local political organizations, several have been highly influential in Javakheti 
over the past two decades. The first was Javakh, a local ethnic Armenian self-help 
organization that was established in 1988 to defend the local Armenian population against 
what they saw as a threat from Georgian nationalists such as Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who 
became president of Georgia in 1991. Javakh was able even to acquire arms from the poorly-
supervised weapons supplies of the moribund Soviet army and some members of the 
 
23 In both cases these findings are statistically significant at the 0.001 level, both using Levene's test for 
equality of variance, and the t-test for equality of means. 
24 Figures from the website of the Central Election Commission of Georgia at www.cec.gov.ge. 
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organization helped the Karabakh Armenians in the war with Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. 
Javakh dominated political life in the region during the early 1990s and even prevented 
Gamsakhurdia from imposing his choice of Prefect (gamgebeli) on Akhalkalaki district, 
eventually forcing the Georgian government to accept one of its own leaders, Samvel 
Petrosyan (see above) as Prefect instead. However, following Shevardnadze’s return to 
Georgia in March 1992, Javakh’s power gradually began to diminish. During the mid-1990s, 
Shevardnadze successfully applied a policy of “divide and rule” by offering the leaders of 
the organization positions in the local state structures, including Petrosyan, who obtained a 
senior position in the traffic police. 
Another influential organization is Virk. Virk was established in the late 1990s as a regional 
political party to lobby for Javakheti's political autonomy within Georgia but was denied 
registration as a national political party because the Law on Political Associations of Citizens 
does not allow the establishment of regional parties (Wheatley 2004; Lohm 2007). Virk was 
never able to attract the same number of followers as Javakh had previously. 
Relative newcomers on the scene are the youth organization JEMM (Javakheti Youth Sport 
Union) and the unregistered political party, United Javakh, that was established by a number 
of JEMM's leaders. JEMM was founded as an NGO in 2001 and its main aim was to prevent 
the massive out-migration of Javakheti's youth by organising sporting events and setting up 
at least twenty gyms in Akhalkalaki and the surrounding villages. They also set up a radio 
station and a monthly magazine (Lohm 2007). In 2005, a number of JEMM activists, 
including the group's leader, Vahag Chakhalyan, established the political organization United 
Javakh. United Javakh first emerged into the limelight on 13 March 2005, when it organized 
a rally in Akhalkalaki to protest against the Georgian government's plans to withdraw 
Russia's military base from Akhalkalaki, which formed a cornerstone of the local economy 
and was perceived by the local population as a guarantee against future Turkish aggression. 
A similar rally was held on 31 March and both events attracted a couple of thousand 
protesters. United Javakh represented a younger generation of activists, who were 
disillusioned at the perceived enthusiasm of the older generation of Javakh activists to make 
a deal with the authorities for their own personal gain.  
United Javakh probably reached the zenith of its powers around the time of the local 
elections in September 2006. Although United Javakh was denied official recognition as a 
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political party in Georgia on the same grounds that Virk had been denied recognition, the 
movement came to an agreement with the national opposition party “Industry Will Save 
Georgia” (IWSG) to put its candidates on the IWSG list for Akhalkalaki municipality. In 
addition, a number of United Javakh's activists and sympathisers stood as candidates in the 
twenty-two single-mandate constituencies based around villages or clusters of villages in 
Akhalkalaki. Not only did IWSG garner over 30% of the vote (see above), despite alleged 
voting irregularities, but the former mayor of Akhalkalaki, Nair Iritsyan, now a sympathiser 
of United Javakh, won the single-mandate constituency of Akhalkalaki city―which had 
many more voters than any other constituency in the district―defeating the favoured 
candidate of the local and national authorities. Another supporter of United Javakh, Andranik 
Abelyan, also prevailed in the community of Kumurdo. In Ninotsminda, however, United 
Javakh had less success; the UNM ran uncontested and its party list as well as most 
candidates in single-mandate constituencies were supporters of either Enzel Mkoyan or Mels 
Bdoyan (see above). 
The relative success of United Javakh at once drew the attention of the local and national 
authorities, who sought to undermine the new movement both by force and persuasion. Two 
days after the elections United Javakh staged a demonstration in Akhalkalaki against what 
they claimed was massive voter fraud in the elections, especially in Akhalkalaki's villages25 
and protesters tried to take over the office of the District Election Commission in Javakheti. 
As a result a brawl developed in which shots were fired into the air and Akhalkalaki's chief 
of police, Samvel Petrosyan, was slightly injured. Chakhalyan was arrested soon afterwards 
in Armenia after crossing the Georgian-Armenia border, although he was released again 
some three weeks later. The local elites then united in their opposition to United Javakh with 
even the normally radical Davit Rstakyan (Virk), finding common cause with his erstwhile 
opponents, sharply criticising the new organization. 
Throughout 2007 and 2008, the influence of United Javakh diminished sharply as the 
organization began to fragment. In the months after the disputed elections, tensions remained 
high; Iritsyan remained sharply critical of the local authorities, especially after he was not 
given the chair of any of the committees of the new Akhalkalaki sakrebulo, despite winning 
more votes than any other candidate in the local elections. In April 2007, Iritsyan was even 
briefly arrested after a dispute between him and a number of United Javakh activists 
 
25 In one village, the UNM allegedly won over 100% of the vote! 
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(including Abelyan) on the one hand and the driver of the local prosecutor on the other.26 
However, after a close associate of Iritsyan's, Harutyun Hovannesyan, was appointed 
gamgebeli of Akhalkalaki municipality on 7 February, Iritsyan was made his deputy.27 Later, 
on 2 May 2008, after Hovannesyan had been selected as candidate in the single-mandate 
constituency of Akhalkalaki for the UNM in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, 
Iritsyan was made gamgebeli.28 Despite his earlier oppositional stance, Iritsyan was able to 
find common language with the authorities and it was possibly as a result of his influence 
that both Hovannesyan and the UNM were able to acheive such a handsome victory in the 
2008 parliamentary elections in Akhalkalaki (see above). Moreover, unlike in previous 
contests, rivals of the authorities (such as what was left of United Javakh) did not lend their 
support to any national opposition party. 
Vahag Chakhalyan, meanwhile, remained an implacable opponent of the local authorities in 
Javakheti, and his relationship with the chief of police of Akhalkalaki, Samvel Petrosyan was 
particularly poor. On 17 July 2008 there was a powerful explosion near Petrosyan's house, 
which Petrosyan blamed on United Javakh activist Gurgen Shirinyan. There then followed a 
police operation against the activists of United Javakh, during which two policemen died in 
unclear circumstances and firearms were allegedly discovered in the offices of United 
Javakh. Around fifteen activists were arrested, including Chakhalyan, and members of both 
Shirinyan's and Chakhalyan's families. Shirinyan himself escaped and his wheareabouts 
remain unknown. United Javakh accused the local authorities of staging the bomb blast near 
Petrosyan's house to provide a pretext to launch a crackdown against United Javakh and of 
planting arms in the offices of the movement. It is interesting to note that apart for the 
possession of firearms, Chakhalyan was not charged with any offences relating to the events 
of July 2008, but was instead charged with alleged provocations committed in the aftermath 
of the local elections in October 2006 and during demonstrations earlier the same year, even 
though no charges had been levelled against him immediately after these events. In 
December 2008, Shirinyan was sentenced to seventeen years' imprisionment in absentia for 
murder, while his father and aunt were convicted of providing false testimony and sentenced 
 
26 “Former Mayor of Akhalkalaki was Arrested”, Armenian News (25 April 2007) at 
http://www.armtown.com/news/en/lra/20070425/12105/. 
27 “New President for the Council” (A-Info website, 10 February 2008), at http://www.a-
info.org/eng/full.php?id=1922, accessed 28 June 2009. 
28 “Nairi Iritsian Elected Chairperson of Akhalkalak Regional Administration” Noyan Tapan: Armenians 
Today, 8 May  2008, at http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/archive/136998.html. 
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to two years.29 In April 2009, Chakhalyan was found guilty of a number of charges, most 
dating back to 2006, and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, while his father and teenage 
brother received heavy fines for the purchase and possession of weapons.30 Given the time 
that had passed since the alleged offences were committed by Chakhalyan it is hard to 
explain these events in any other way than as an attempt by the authorities to crush the 
United Javakh movement. 
Another part of United Javakh appears to be involved in a struggle for economic influence 
with the local authorities in Javakheti. The village of Kumurdo appears to be home to a 
family of powerful businessmen that provide support to United Javakh and at the same time 
are involved in a number of economic spheres that the local political elites have traditionally 
monopolized, such as the provision of petrol stations. One of these businessmen―who now 
resides mainly in Russia―is believed to have had a licence to cut wood in Georgia and to 
sell it to Armenia, although this licence was later revoked (International Crisis Group 2006). 
It is worth noting that Kumurdo was one of the communities to elect a United Javakh 
councillor in 2006 (see above). A dispute over business would appear to have precipitated a 
fight in January 2009 between the supporters of the Kumurdo businessmen on the one hand 
and Enzel Mkoyan and his supporters on the other. The fight allegedly left Mkoyan injured 
and resulted in the arrest of four men, although two were later released after paying a fine.31 
Other activists from Samtskhe-Javakheti that have come into conflict with the authorities 
include Grigol Minasyan, the director of the Armenian Youth Centre of Akhaltsikhe, and 
Sargis Akopjanyan, the chairman of the Charles Asnavour Society. This followed an incident 
in which representatives from a putative Belarussian NGO called the Association for Legal 
Assistance to the Population (ALAP) came to Akhalkalaki to carry out a public opinion 
survey. The survey, inter alia, contained provocative questions about the arrival of 
Meskhetian Turks and about separatist movements. The promoters of the questionnaire 
 
29 "Armenian Activists in Javakh Subject to Political Persecution" Hetq Online (12 January 2009), at 
http://hetq.am/en/court/armenian-activists-in-javakh-subject-to-political-persecution/; "A Leader of 
Georgia’s Javakheti Region Seeks Justice" at http://armenhes.blogspot.com/2009/03/leader-of-georgias-
javakheti-region.html.  
30 "Vahagn Chakhalyan Sentenced To 10 Years In Prison", Oratert (9 April 2009) at 
http://eng.oratert.com/armenia-hotline/58.html, accessed 28 June 2009. 
31 Interviews with the author; "Car of 'United Javakhk' Chairmanship Member Khachik Saharian Blown Up: 
Latter is Taken to Hospital" from the website "Javakh: The Hidden Truth", quoting Noyan Tapan: 
Armenians Today (13 March 2007) at http://www.djavakhk.com/detail.php?r=0&id=4992&l=en; "Bomb 
Went Off in United Javakheti Member’s Car" (12 March 2007) at 
http://www.armtown.com/news/en/lra/20070312/10749/. 
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promised to pay up to USD 800 to those who were prepared to interview people and conduct 
the surveys.32 Minasyan and Akopjanyan were among the most active in promoting the 
survey and as a result were arrested in January 2009 on charges of espionage, although they 
were released again in March pending further investigation. Clearly ALAP was not a genuine 
NGO and was instead a front for some other organization; although a human rights 
organization called ALAP existed in Belarus in the late 1990s, its leaders were harassed by 
the country's authoritarian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, and the Belarussian courts 
moved to liquidate the organization in 2003.33 The Georgian government clearly feared that 
it was part of an attempt by the Russian secret services to provoke separatist sentiment in 
Javakheti in the wake of the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Many local 
actors doubt that this act of provocation was arranged by the Russians and suggest that it was 
set up by the Georgian authorities to expose potentially Russia-loyal activists (see below). 
In terms of business elites, in addition to those who are closely connected with the local 
authorities or to United Javakh, a number of emigre businessmen have also invested in 
Javakheti. The businessman Aram Sanosyan, a native of Satkha village in Ninotsminda 
district and currently a resident in Russia, recently built a water pipeline in his native village 
of Satkha and launched a project to relaunch the garment factory in Ninotsminda (see 
above).34 He is also said to be involved in the management of the gasification project in 
Akhalkalaki.35 His brother, Hayk Sanosyan, is a member of the presidium of “Georgian-
Armenian Unity” and an MP in the Armenian parliament. The Sanosyans are believed to be 
involved in other business and infrastructure projects in the region, including a flour mill, a 
cheese plant in Akhalkalaki and other smaller businesses. They are believed to enjoy a good 
relationship with the Georgian government. 
There are over 100 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Javakheti, of which 
approximately twenty are active in terms of implementing projects. The most active segment 
of Javakheti's non-governmental sector is the Javkaheti Citizens' Forum (JCF), which by the 
beginning of 2009 had united under its umbrella 25 NGOs and 458 individuals. The JCF was 
 
32 Interviews with the author. 
33 Belarus Human Rights, Civil Society, Anti-Censorship, etc., Organizations at http://www.belarus-
misc.org/bel-hrbl.htm; Molly Corso and Gayane Abrahamyan, "Georgia: Espionage Arrests of Ethnic 
Armenians Stoke Suspicion of Russia", Eurasia Insight, 12 February 2009 at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav021209b.shtml. 
34 Noyan Tapan: Armenians Today, 4 May 2007, at http://www.djavakhk.com/detail.php?r=0&id=5235&l=en. 
35 Kristine Aghalaryan, "Javakhk in Peril: Georgian State Machinations and Armenian Apathy", Hetq Online 
(6 April 2009), at http://hetq.am/en/politics/javakhk-5/. 
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established in 2004 with the support of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) with 
a view to building the capacity of local communities to aggregate their interests and to 
establish a regular line of communication with the Georgian government. The JCF has 
established working groups, which hold regular meetings to discuss issues facing the local 
communities in the socio-economic sector, in the fields of human rights, culture and 
language issues, and in connection with issues of local self-governance. JCF has also been 
involved in training and capacity-building of local teachers and school directors. In terms of 
contacts with the central government, JCF has begun a dialogue with the Advisor to the 
President on Minority and Civil Integration Issues. Consultations over the status of the public 
hospitals in Javakheti between the Advisor and JCF in the summer of 2008 resulted in 
preserving Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda Public Hospitals on the municipal budget. JCF also 
holds meetings with the Ministry of Education and Science on education issues, especially 
the use of the Georgian language in education. By late 2008, the forum had become more or 
less sustainable and while ECMI planned to continue provision of limited assistance to JCF 
through small grants in 2009, it was otherwise set to function independently. By 2009, JCF 
was probably the most powerful and effective non-governmental player in Javakheti and is 
perceived by the central authorities as a force to be reckoned with. While this has encouraged 
the central government to engage with the forum on certain key issues, the existence of a 
relatively powerful body representing mainly ethnic Armenian local interests has also led to 
a degree of suspicion amongst certain circles within the government who fear that it could be 
captured by interests representing separatism. While the earlier sympathetic position of the 
co-chairman of JCF, Nair Iritsyan, towards United Javakh may have fuelled such suspicions, 
the subsequent rapprochement between the government and Iritsyan, culminating in the 
latter's appointment as gamgebeli (see above), improved trust between the two sides. 
Nevertheless, there were signs of the old suspicion returning, especially after the war 
between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. The revelation that the bogus Belarussian NGO 
ALAP (see above) had approached a range of civil society activists, including also members 
of the JCF, led to increased surveillance by Georgian counter-intelligence agencies towards 
the NGO sector. 
Kvemo Kartli 
Compared with Javakheti there are far fewer influential local actors, given the tendency 
noted above for the central authorities to be far more involved in the day-to-day management 
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of the region and not to co-opt leaders of the minority community to run local affairs in the 
same way as they do in Javakheti. Most of the Georgian administrators in Kvemo Kartli 
district are either activists from the National Movement or have a background in the law 
enforcement agencies or the Prosecutor's office. The gamgeblebi of Marneuli and Dmanisi 
belong to the former category, while the gamgeblebi of Tsalka and Bolnisi belong to the 
latter. In Tsalka the current gamgebeli (as of June 2008) is the former chief of police.36 
Observers note that he is by far the most influential figure in the municipality.37 Many local 
administrators in municipalities populated by national minorities are outsiders, either from 
Tbilisi or from the city of Rustavi.  
Amongst the single mandate members of parliament in Kvemo Kartli, several are prominent 
businessmen, the most notable of whom is Koba Nakopia, the former chairman of the 
supervisory board of the mining company JSC Madneuli. Another is Davit Bezhuashvili, 
single mandate member of parliament for Tetritskaro since 1999 and former director general 
of the gas company Sakgazi. His brother, Gela Bezhuashvili is head of the Georgian 
intelligence service and former Georgian foreign minister. The only Azeri to be elected in a 
single mandate constituency was the long-serving MP and former Shevardnadze ally Azer 
Suleimanov; however Suleimanov is not believed to exert much influence in the region. Two 
ethnic Azeris from Kvemo Kartli were also elected to parliament on the party list of the 
UNM, Ramin Bayramov and Isvakhan Shamilov; the former is a young activist who began 
his career in the NGO sector in Gardabani. 
In the 2003 elections, a local Armenian, Haik Meltonyan, was elected as single-mandate 
member of parliament from Tsalka district for the party “Industry Will Save Georgia” and 
clearly had the support of many of the large Armenian villages in Tsalka municipality.38 
Meltonyan had opposed the uncontrolled settlement of Georgians from Adjara and Svaneti 
that occurred during the period 2002-2006 and gained the votes of many local Armenians 
and Greeks as a result.39 In the parliamentary elections of May 2008 his candidature had 
 
36 “Structural Reorganization at Kvemo Kartli Police”, Kvemo Kartli Independent Media (23 January 2008), at 
http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/reginfo.php?id=745; “New Governor in Tsalka”, Kvemo Kartli Independent 
Media (11 June 2008), at http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/reginfo.php?id=1758.  
37 Interview with stakeholders, 13 April 2009. 
38 Although the contest for the 150 seats elected by proportional representation was held again in March 2004 
after the Rose Revolution because of irregularities in the 2003 poll, those elected to single-mandate 
constituencies in November 2003 were allowed to take their seats in the 2004-2008 parliament without the 
need for a repeat ballot. 
39 Zaza Baazov, ‘Georgian Resettlement Scheme Blamed for Tension’, Caucasus Reporting Service, No. 280, 
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been proposed by the bloc “Traditionalists―Our Georgia and Women’s Party”, but his 
candidacy was withdrawn by the Traditionalists bloc ten days before voting.40 This led to a 
relatively high abstention rate amongst the electorate in Tsalka municipality as only around a 
third of registered voters came to the polling stations.41 This was significantly less than in 
other regions of Kvemo Kartli, although this may be partly due to the absence of working-
age Armenian men engaged in seasonal labour in Russia and the fact that many ethnic 
Greeks who had already left the district may still be registered. Nevertheless, the fact that 
only 269 voters out of a total population of 1,500 in Meltonyan's home village of Nardevani 
turned out to vote, suggests that a disproportionate number of Armenians deliberately 
abstained from voting.42 
During the administration of Eduard Shevardnadze, the community organization Geyrat was 
believed to exert significant influence over Azeri communities in Marneuli and Bolnisi 
districts in particular. Formed in 1990 from the local Azeri intelligentsia, Geyrat helped to 
protect Azeri citizens during the violent upheavals of the early 1990s, later helped to defuse 
inter-communal conflicts within the local Azeri community and sometimes also played a 
mediating role between the community and state law enforcement agencies. However, the 
movement began to divide in the late 1990s as several prominent members of the 
organization took up positions in state structures (Wheatley 2005). Geyrat lost more ground 
in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution; as the capacity of the state increased, the central 
authorities and the official law enforcement agencies gained a complete monopoly over the 
conflict resolution process in the region and Geyrat lost its former mediating role and was 
sidelined by the new government. Leaders of Geyrat claim that the organization's members 
were subject to pressure from the gamgeoba and from the law enforcement agencies not to 
stand as candidates for the local elections of October 2006. Today Geyrat exists as a small 
NGO aimed at defending the rights of ethnic Azeris. While they occasionally organize 
protest rallies against the Georgian government and have certain links with a number of 
political groups and media outlets in Baku, their influence is a fraction of what it once was 
(International Crisis Group 2006).  
 
1 April, 2005, at www.iwpr.net. 
40 See Central Election Commission of Georgia at http://cec.gov.ge/?que=eng/press-center/press-
releases&info=1264. Note that in the 2008 elections all candidates for single-mandate constituencies had to 
be nominated by a party or bloc. 
41 "Election Winners", Kvemo Kartli Independent Media, at http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/articles.php?id=32. 
42 <http://e-vote-count.info/?lang=en&district_id=15&precinct_id=656>, accessed 4 April 2009. 
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Another Azeri nationalist organization operating in Kvemo Kartli is the National Assembly 
of Azeris in Georgia (NAAG), founded in 2001. NAAG appears to take a more radical 
position than Geyrat; its leader Dashgin Gulmamedov has called for the creation of a 
Georgian confederation of constituent regions, and for Azeri to be made an official state 
language of Georgia.43 Based in Baku and claiming over 14,000 members, NAAG's 
relationship with both the Georgian and the Azeri authorities is tense. After Gulmamedov 
accused Georgian gynecologists at maternity hospitals of damaging Azerbaijani women in 
childbirth, the Georgian authorities began to accuse him and the NAAG of being sponsored 
by Igor Giorgadze, the pro-Russian former Georgian KGB chief, and bete-noire of the 
Georgian government.44 In November 2007 Gulmamedov was arrested and briefly detained 
in Georgia for allegedly propagating national conflicts45  and in March 2009, Gulmamedov 
was arrested by the Azerbaijani authorities in Baku, charged with swindle and jailed for two 
years.46 Generally speaking, the authorities in Baku support the Georgian authorities' policies 
towards groups in Georgia that are seen as promoting Azeri separatism and it is likely that 
Gulmamedov's imprisonment was a result of collaboration between the two governments. 
Gulmamedov's name has been linked with another controversial figure from Kvemo Kartli, 
Fazil Aliyev. Aliyev, despite his Azeri nationality, was originally a supporter of the 
nationalist Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia. During the Gamsakhurdia government he 
was briefly mayor of Gardabani and subsequently deputy prefect of Gardabani district. 
Following Shevardnadze's return to Georgia he established his own natural gas business, 
which faced pressure from the governor of Kvemo Kartli, Levan Mamaladze, who sought to 
bring all economic enterprises in the region under his control. Aliyev claimed that his family 
was victimized by the local authorities and that masked men attacked the school where his 
children were studying. He also claimed that this persecution continued under Mikheil 
Saakashvili and an armed attack on his house in June 2005, which he claimed was the work 
 
43 "Ethnic Azeris demand change in Georgia’s political system", Interfax, (Jan 28 2009) at 
http://groong.netwerk.mine.nu:8888/wmu/tag/ethnic/. 
44 News report dated 26 April 2006 at http://003eaa4.netsolhost.com/news.asp?news=8350. 
45 "Security services of Georgia arrested leader of Azerbaijani diaspora", Eurasian Security Services Daily 
Review (29 November 2007), at http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1440. 
46 "Dashgin Gulmamedov Arrested for Swindle", Turan, (11 March 2009) at 
http://dir.groups.yahoo.com/group/HR-Georgia-eng/message/916; "Georgian Azerbaijanis to hold protest 
action", Today.Az, (15 May 2009), at http://www.today.az/news/politics/52331.html; "Head of National 
Assembly of Azerbaijanis of Georgia arrested in Baku" (11 March 2009 ), at 
http://www.today.az/print/news/society/51003.html. 
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of the authorities, led him to seek sanctuary in Azerbaijan.47 In November 2007, when 
NAAG nominated him as candidate for the January 2008 presidential elections in Georgia, 
he returned to Georgia and appointed Gulmamedov as his campaign chief. However, 
following Gulmamedov's arrest, he was forced to withdraw from the race. He stood as 
candidate for the single-mandate member of parliament in Gardabani district in the 
parliamentary elections of May 2008 for the Christian Democratic Alliance, but failed to 
garner even 2% of the vote.  
A more moderate group established to represent the interests of the Azeri community in 
Kvemo Kartli is the Congress of Georgian Azeris, established in March 2008 as an umbrella 
group uniting at least twelve Georgia-based Azeri NGOs.48 The congress denies that it is a 
political organization and claims that it merely aims to protect the rights of ethnic Azeris and 
to assist the integration of Azeris into the Georgian community.49 Its chairman and co-
founder, Ali Babayev has expressed strong criticism of the Georgian government, which he 
accuses of treating Azeris as second class citizens, and―like Fazil Aliyev―stood as a 
candidate for the opposition Republican Party in the single-mandate district of Gardabani in 
the parliamentary elections of May 2008, garnering just over 4% of the vote. The Congress 
has recently been campaigning for the Georgian government to reopen the Sadakhlo bazaar 
in Marneuli district near the border of Georgia with Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was 
closed by the authorities in 2005 to prevent smuggling (see below).50 The Congress has also 
contributed to an alternative NGO report on the implementation by Georgia of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the region of Kvemo 
Kartli. Despite its relatively moderate position, the Congress is viewed with suspicion by 
 
47 F. Teymurkhanli, "Saakashvili's Accession Created More Problems for Azerbaijanis in Georgia", Zerkalo 
newspaper (Azerbaijan), 10 October 2005, at 
http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/forum/showthread.php?t=39332; “Priezidenty Gruzii Fazil' Aliiev 
Opasaietcia za svoiu Zhizn'”, News Bakililar.az, at 
http://news.bakililar.az/news_kandidat_v_prezidenty_11310.html. 
48 See "Tolerance” Public Association for Human Rights Protection, "On the implementation by Georgia of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in the region of Kvemo Kartli (Georgia): 
Alternative NGO report" (Tbilisi 2008) at 
http://www.minelres.lv/reports/georgia/Shadow_Report_Georgia_2008.pdf ; "Founding Meeting of 
Georgian Azerbaijanis’ Congress to Take Place on 17 March – Co-founder", Trend News (15 March 2008) 
at http://news-en.trend.az/society/diaspora/1157388.html. 
49 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Caucasus Report, Georgia's Azeri Minority Treated As 'Second-Class 
Citizens'  (May 4, 2009) at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgias_Azeri_Minority_Treated_As_SecondClass_Citizens/1621243.html. 
50 "Congress Of Georgia's Azerbaijanis Applies Georgian President To Restore Sadakhlo Fair", Turkish 
Weekly 22 April 2009 at http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/73615/-congress-of-georgia-s-azerbaijanis-
applies-georgian-president-to-restore-sadakhlo-fair.html. 
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many representatives of the authorities, especially at local level; at its inaugural conference 
in March 2008, informal pressure by the local authorities was applied to a number of 
founding NGOs not to attend.51 
In terms of NGOs, another influential umbrella organization is the Tsalka Citizens' Forum 
(TCF). Established in 2005 by ECMI to promote dialogue between local communities in 
Tsalka and the central government, it has yet to develop the organizational capacity of its 
counterpart in Javakheti, but by 2009 still managed to unite 7 NGOs and 120 individuals. As 
well as implementing a number of small grants project and running a resource centre in 
which training is provided in computing, the TCF has also arranged meetings with 
representatives of local government and engaged in extensive consultations with JCF and the 
Council of National Minorities under the state ombudsman's office on issues relevant to 
multilingual education. 
At village level in Kvemo Kartli respected figures, typically of a relatively advanced age, 
have traditionally wielded significant authority within Azeri communities and have often 
successfully prevented conflict both between and within villages. Known as aksakals (“white 
beards”) these individuals typically belonged to the provincial intelligentsia and were often 
school directors or simply well-versed in the Islamic behavioural code, adat (Wheatley 
2005). Some members of Geyrat were also aksakals. The role of aksakals, however, has 
become ever more marginal in recent years, especially as conflict resolution is now firmly in 
the hands of the official law enforcement agencies. According to some reports, however, 
aksakals have had an input in prioritizing projects for the Village Support Programme; 
reportedly, under their initiative sixteen public gathering places are to be constructed in the 
villages in Marneuli municipality within the framework of the programme.52 
As in Javakheti, opposition parties have little or no influence in Kvemo Kartli, especially in 
those areas in which the Azeri minority is concentrated. According to the above-mentioned 
survey carried out by ECMI in May 2008, the non-Georgian population of Gardabani, 
Marneuli, and Dmanisi municipalities (mainly Azeris) appeared to be even less aware of the 
party system than their counterparts in Javakheti. On average they could only name 1.38 of 
the twelve parties and blocs competing in the elections, and when prompted by being read 
 
51 Tolerance, "On the implementation by Georgia...” 
52 “Village Support Program”, Kvemo Kartli Independent Media at 
http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/articles.php?id=77. 
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the full list of parties and blocs, they could recognize just 2.05 on average, compared with an 
average of 6.67 for ethnic Georgians in Kakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti and 
2.83 for non-Georgians (mainly Armenians) in Javakheti.53 Many members of national 
minorities in Kvemo Kartli only knew of the ruling UNM. It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that the UNM won the elections in Kvemo Kartli by a massive margin. 
5. Migration and Seasonal Labour 
 
Over the last twenty years, Georgia has been subject to major demographic changes, which 
have led to a significant migration out of the country. Although both Georgians and members 
of national minorities have left the country, disproportionately more members of the latter 
group have emigrated. If we compare the 1989 and 2002 censuses and compare the 
proportion of each national group in all districts of the country in which both censuses were 
carried out (i.e. excluding most of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
where the 2002 census could not be carried out), we find that the proportion of national 
minorities fell from 26.4% in 1989 to 16.2% in 2002. Most of this fall is accounted for by 
reductions in the size of the Russian (from 6.3% to 1.5%), Armenian (from 7.5% to 5.7%) 
and Greek (from 1.8% to 0.3%) populations. Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti have 
been relatively unaffected by these trends, except for Tsalka municipality, where the 
proportion of ethnic Greeks fell from 61.0% in 1989 to 22.0% in 2002 (and to around 5% 
today), Akhaltsikhe municipality, where the proportion of Armenians fell from 42.8% in 
1989 to 36.6% in 2002, and Ninotsminda municipality, where the proportion of Russians 
(mainly belonging to the Dukhobor religious sect) fell from 8.3% in 1989 to 2.7% in 2002 
(and far fewer today). Of these major demographic changes, both out-migration of Greeks 
from Tsalka and of Dukhobors from Ninotsminda will be the focus of this paper; however, I 
will also look at two other trends that have shaped the lives of members of national 
minorities in recent years: the tendency of ethnic Armenians in Javakheti and Tsalka districts 
to travel to Russia in the summer for seasonal labour and the migration of Georgians from 
Adjara and from the mountainous region of Svaneti in the north of the country into regions in 
which national minorities are concentrated―most notably Tsalka municipality.  
Tsalka: The Greek exodus and the arrival of ecological and economic migrants 
 
53 In both cases these findings are statistically significant at the 0.001 level, both using Levene's test for 
equality of variance, and the t-test for equality of means. 
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Following the collapse of the USSR and the instability and warlordism that occurred in 
Georgia in the early 1990s, the Greek population of Tsalka began to leave for Greece. 
Georgian Greeks could enter Greece relatively easily as Greek immigration law was poorly 
enforced and immigration of those claiming Greek ethnicity was encouraged. According to 
unofficial figures provided by the gamgebeli of Tsalka municipality, by 2006 the number of 
Greeks had fallen to around 1,500 from just under 4,600 in 2002 and just over 27,000 in 
1989. Local experts estimated that by 2009 there were no more than 1,000 Greeks in Tsalka 
municipality, most of them elderly.  
Once the exodus of Greeks was well underway, a major process of in-migration began from 
other parts of Georgia. According to figures provided by Tsalka municipality gamgeoba, by 
2006 around 6,500 ethnic Georgian migrants had settled in the municipality. By far the 
greatest number of these (approximately 70%) came from the Autonomous Republic of 
Adjara and most of these came from Khulo municipality, which is notorious for landslides 
and a shortage of land. Some also came from the mountainous region of Svaneti in the 
northwest of the country, which is often affected by avalanches. Mass migration from Adjara 
and Svaneti began in 1998, and gathered pace in 2002 despite the unwillingness and/or 
incapacity of Eduard Shevardnadze's government to regulate or even register internal 
migration. The new wave of migration that occurred in 2002 was almost entirely 
spontaneous as those who had already settled near Tsalka invited their relatives. It was also 
partly motivated by the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which 
passed through the district and provided (generally unskilled) work for many of the 
newcomers. Until 2004 the flow of migrants was totally unregulated; many of the 
newcomers were not even registered with the local sakrebulo and their names did not appear 
in any local census (Wheatley 2006). During 2005-2006, some effort was made to monitor 
who was settling and during 2006 the flow of economic migrants slowed anyway as work on 
the pipeline dried up. Smaller groups of migrants, mainly from mountainous regions of 
Adjara affected by landslides, have been allowed by the government to settle since 2006; 
however this process was far better administered than previously and the migrants are 
predominantly ecological migrants, rather than economic migrants. 
The rapid influx of new migrants into Tsalka led to an unstable and conflict-prone situation 
in which two groups of people coexisted but had little capacity to communicate. On the one 
hand was the original population that consisted mainly of Armenians and the few remaining 
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Greeks, as well as a few compact settlements of Azeris, who had little contact with other 
population groups. On the other hand there were a large number of newly-arrived rural 
Georgians, most of whom could not speak Russian, which had hitherto been the main 
language of inter-ethnic communication. The communication barrier between the two groups 
combined with the lack of any kind of state regulation was bound to lead to tension and this 
was exacerbated by land shortages and a perception by many of the original inhabitants that 
the newcomers were favoured for work on the BTC pipeline. After a spate of clashes 
between original inhabitants and newcomers, which reached a peak in early 2005, Georgian 
law enforcement agencies entered the region and began to restore order (Wheatley 2006). 
The subsequent decline in the number of new arrivals combined with greater control by the 
law enforcement agencies has since appeared to calm the situation. 
Seasonal Migration 
Seasonal migration to Russia is prevalent amongst the Armenian populations of Javakheti 
and Tsalka municipalities. A significant proportion of working-age men from these 
communities travel every year to Russia (generally early spring) to work as manual labourers 
(typically in the construction sector). Despite the recent deterioration of relations between 
Russia and Georgia, this process is continuing, because most of the migrant workers have 
obtained either Armenian or Russian passports. While Georgian citizens face draconian 
restrictions if they want to visit Russia, Armenian citizens can enter relatively easily. 
However, according to Georgian law dual citizenship is not permitted and an individual who 
adopts the citizenship of another country, in principle, automatically loses his or her 
Georgian citizenship, a fact of which most Armenians of Javakheti and Tsalka are unaware. 
It is estimated that two or three thousand inhabitants of Javakheti may have Russian 
citizenship; many obtained Russian passports when the 62nd Divisional Russian military base 
was stationed in Akhalkalaki (before its withdrawal in 2007). All military personnel at the 
base (of which around a thousand were local Armenians) were required to adopt Russian 
citizenship. During that time and subsequently, dealers have also been operating in 
Akhalkalaki selling Russian (and Armenian) passports for those wishing to work in Russia 
and some citizens also travel to Yerevan in order to obtain Russian passports. The number of 
local Armenians with Russian passports has alarmed the Georgian authorities, who fear that 
Russia may use this issue as a pretext for intervening in Javakheti, given that the justification 
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for Russia's intervention in South Ossetia was ostensibly to protect its own citizens.54 Since 
February 2007, when Armenia adopted a law allowing dual citizenship for foreign nationals 
of Armenian descent, there has been increasing demand for Armenian passports, which 
appears to have accelerated since the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia reduced 
the opportunities for Georgian citizens to receive Russian passports. During the first few 
months of 2009, demand for Armenian passports was particularly high as local residents 
planned to leave for seasonal work in Russia; according to one source, 1,500 individuals 
from Javakheti received Armenian passports in the beginning of 2009.55 Some young people 
also took Armenian passports to work or study in Yerevan. 
Although accurate figures are unavailable, it is likely that the number of seasonal migrants 
has fallen significantly over the last few years partly as a result of bureaucratic barriers, 
partly as a result of reported instances of discrimination against migrants from the Caucasus 
in Russia and partly because of the infrastructural improvements that have taken place in 
some settlements in Javakheti (see above), which may have encouraged some inhabitants to 
remain. For example, in the village of Kartikami, a few kilometers from Akhalkalaki, 
virtually no-one leaves the village for summer work in Russia today, even though it was 
common several years ago. Seasonal migration from the more remote villages, however, still 
occurs. 
Departure of the Dukhobors 
The Russian religious dissenters, the Dukhobors, were exiled to the periphery of the Russian 
Empire in the 1830s and 1840s for their refusal to do military service or pay taxes. They 
established eight settlements in what is now Ninotsminda municipality (then called 
Bogdanovka): the town of Bogdanovka (now Ninotsminda), and the villages of Gorelovka, 
Tambovka, Orlovka, Spasovka, Troitskoye or Kalinino (now Sameba), Yefremovka and 
Rodionovka. By 1989, 3,161 Dukhobors remained in Ninotsminda district but during the 
1990s most left for Russia as a result of the ethnic chauvinism that erupted in Georgia during 
the leadership of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-91) and of the instability that followed (during 
which the region was controlled by the paramilitary Armenian organization Javakh, see 
above). They were also encouraged to return to Russia by a number of Russian patriotic 
organizations, and by the time the 2002 census was carried out just 943 Dukhobors 
 
54 From 2002, a majority of citizens living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia were granted Russian passports. 
55 Interviews with the author. 
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remained, mainly in the villages of Gorelovka and Orlovka. In some villages, such as 
Spasovka, ecological migrants from Adjara (ethnic Georgians) arrived to replace them, while 
in other villages Georgian migrants came for a short time, but did not stay (Lohm 2006). 
The emigration of Dukhobors continued through the first decade of the twenty-first century 
and by the time of writing (mid-2009) some of the last Dukhobors were preparing to leave 
the village of Gorelovka. The turning point came in 2005-2006 as a result of increasing 
pressure exerted by the local authorities for control over Dukhobor lands (see next section). 
Following a number of incidents of vandalism of Dukhobor property in late 2006, the 
community decided to leave for Russia. About fifty Dukhobor families left in 2007 for the 
Bondarsky district of Tambov province in Russia and it was planned that the rest of the 
community would leave in 2008. However, the war between Russia and Georgia appears to 
have put their plans to emigrate on hold, at least for a while, as it is unclear how the 
Dukhobors―for the most part Georgian citizens―will be able to obtain Russian visas.  
According to a Dukhobor community leader, by mid 2009 there were 58 Dukhobor families 
left in Gorelovka, covering about 200 individuals.56 
The departure of the Dukhobors has provoked competition between Georgians and 
Armenians as to who has the right to occupy the houses they are abandoning. Local 
Armenian residents rushed to claim the houses and associated lands and it was reported that 
this action was coordinated by the family of the former head of Gorelovka community (temi) 
sakrebulo and current head of the District Election Commission of Ninotsminda 
municipality. It was also reported that the Georgian Ministry of Refugees and 
Accommodation was buying the abandoned houses, leading to fears amongst the local 
Armenian community that they would be used for the resettlement of (ethnic Georgian) 
economic migrants. According to one report, the Ministry was buying up those houses that 
had been purchased for Georgian eco-migrants by the nationalist organization, the Merab 
Kostava Foundation, when the last wave of Dukhobors emigrated in the early 1990s. Many 
of these houses were informally occupied by local Armenians after Georgian migrants had 
either failed to resettle or abandoned them after a short stay.57 The rumours and counter-
 
56 Interviews with ECMI staff. 
57 During the period 1989-91, the Kostava Foundation bought 258 houses for eco-migrants and other families 
in need, of which 217 were in Dukhobor settlements in Ninotsminda district. Out of these 14 houses were 
located in Ninotsminda, 31 in Spasovka village, 36 in Yefremovka, 20 in Orlovka, 47 in Gorelovka and 69 
in Sameba. However of the 217 houses in question, just 68 out were handed over to the new owners; the rest 
remained empty or were taken over by local Armenians (Trier and Turashvili 2007). 
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rumours that began to spread in Ninotsminda municipality as the Dukhobors left led to 
considerable uncertainty about who would have the rights to their houses and land. By 2009, 
local sources reported that 35 Georgian families from Adjara had recently settled in 
Gorelovka, constituting between 120 and 140 individuals.58 
6. Land Distribution 
 
Within Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javakheti there are three issues that have had the 
potential to exacerbate ethnic tensions over the past ten or fifteen years. These are: (i) a 
shortage of land in Marneuli and Bolnisi municipalities, especially in predominantly Azeri 
villages, (ii) the distribution of land formerly owned by ethnic Greeks to (mainly ethnic 
Georgian) ecological and economic migrants in Tsalka district and (iii) the redistribution of 
land formerly owned by the Russian Dukhobor communities in Ninotsmida municipality in 
Samtskhe-Javakheti. 
Distribution of Land in Marneuli and Bolnisi municipalities 
According to a resolution passed by the Georgian government in 1992, no land could be 
privatized within 21km of the state border. The same resolution redistributed land from the 
former collective farms to private owners, paving the way for the formal privatization 
process, which began after the Law on the Ownership of Agricultural Land was passed in 
1996. The 21 km limitation had already been cancelled by a new resolution of the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Georgia in 1994, although the law On the State Border (1998) defined a 5km 
border zone and a 500m border line in which land privatization remained restricted. By the 
time the 21 km restriction was lifted, much of the land near the border had already been 
leased out by the state in a non-transparent manner. Subsequently there was no opportunity 
for those affected by this law to get the land back and their land allocation was restricted to 
their household plot (generally 0.15-0.25 hectares). On the other hand, those in other regions 
of Georgia that benefited fully from the distribution of collective farm land received up to 
1.25 hectares. Although the 21km rule ostensibly applied to all those living close to the state 
border, in practice it was applied selectively mainly to Kvemo Kartli and the main losers 
were ethnic Azeris in Marneuli and Bolnisi districts, while the main beneficiaries were local 
power-brokers and wealthy businessmen from Tbilisi, most (but not all) of whom were 
ethnic Georgians. On a number of occasions these individuals would then sub-let the land to 
 
58 Interviews with the ECMI staff. 
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local residents for a profit.59 This led to a sense of grievance among many ethnic Azeris and 
violence occasionally erupted in conflicts related to land distribution. One such dispute in 
December 2004 in the village of Kulari (Marneuli district) between local inhabitants and 
employees of the Tbilisi-based Jockey Club, which owned a large horse farm near the 
village, resulted in the death of an elderly Azeri woman. 
In July 2005, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the Law on Privatization of Agricultural 
Land Owned by the State. According to this Law, plough land, meadows, land under 
perennial plants, artificial fishing ponds and general water objects previously owned or 
leased by the state became subject to privatization. It now became possible to privatize land 
within the border zone; even land along the border line (i.e. within 500m of the border) could 
be privatized on a case by case basis with the permission of the Georgian government. 
Privatization was conducted both through auctions and by direct sale; land would be sold by 
means of an auction if it had not been leased, while leased land could be bought through 
direct sale. In most cases, those who were already leasing got first option to buy it. 
Nevertheless, up to 8,000 Azeris received plots of 0.5 hectares during the first seven months 
of 2006 alone as a result of the new law (International Crisis Group 2006). Land along the 
border with Azerbaijan around the village of Vakhtangisi was privatized, and the principal 
beneficiaries were Azeri villagers. Similarly, in certain locations in Kvemo Kartli where 
violations in the original leasing process were revealed, the leased land was taken away from 
the lessees and sold by special auction to the local population, and once again the main 
beneficiaries were Azeris.60 While the current situation marks a significant improvement on 
the situation several years ago, some local Azeris remain short of land. The incapacity of 
much of the Azeri population of Kvemo Kartli to profit from the opportunities of land 
privatisation can be ascribed―in part at least―to a lack of knowledge of their own legal 
rights..  
 
 
 
59 German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and Caucasus Institute of Peace, Democracy and 
Development (Tbilisi), "Potential for Conflict Related to Land Problems in Georgia’s Marneuli and 
Gardabani Districts" at 
http://www.pasos.org/content/download/57477/203611/file/45_171_803701_LandProblem-
Eng%5B1%5D.pdf. 
60 Information obtained from the Association for the Protection of Landowners’ Rights. 
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Redistribution of Land in Tsalka Municipality 
As we saw in the previous section, rapid demographic changes in Tsalka municipality over 
the past ten years have led to a number of disputes over land between the original inhabitants 
(mainly Armenians and Greeks) and the newcomers (mainly Georgians from Adjara and 
Svaneti). The migration process itself was examined above; here our focus will be only on 
the process of land redistribution. 
During the period 1991-2006, the majority of ethnic Greeks emigrated from Tsalka 
municipality, mainly to Greece. From 1998, ecological migrants from Adjara and Svaneti 
began arriving as a result of avalanches and mudslides in their home regions. This migration 
process gained momentum in 2002, when a new wave of migrants, mainly from Adjara, 
arrived in the hope of finding work during the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) oil pipeline which ran through the area. Most of the new migrants occupied the 
houses left by the departing Greeks and frequently rented or “bought” the houses unofficially 
from the relatives of the departees who were still living in the region. However, having no 
legal status, the newcomers had no rights to the lands associated with the houses they had 
occupied (i.e. land from the former collective farms that the former owners had acquired). 
Given the lack of any kind of regulation from the state, this led to resentment and sometimes 
even conflicts between the original residents and the newcomers (Wheatley 2006).  
The Georgian state's first major intervention in this process came in 2006, when the Ministry 
of Refugees and Accommodation began buying houses formerly owned by Greeks. By 2008, 
600 houses had been purchased for ecological migrants and each of the migrant families was 
provided with 1.25 hectares of land. However, other migrant families who had not the good 
fortune to have land purchased for them by the government (mainly economic migrants) 
were left without any land at all, leading to tensions both between newcomers and original 
inhabitants and even within settler communities. According to a new initiative of President 
Saakashvili, all those permanently residing in Tsalka municipality who have no access to 
land―including all new migrants―are now entitled to a “presidential gift” of between 0.3 
and 1.0 hectares. This process began with an amendment to the Law of Georgia On 
Recognition of Title to the Lands Plots Possessed (Used) by Individuals and Legal Entities 
under Public Law on 21 March 2008, which established the principle of a free land 
endowment, and at the time of writing the Georgian parliament planned to further amend the 
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Law to provide free land plots to all those who have not so far received them.61 This latest 
initiative was spearheaded by Tsalka's single mandate member of parliament, Mikheil 
Tskhitishvili.62 The process is expected to be complete by the end of November 2009 and 
1,700 families are expected to benefit.63 
Redistribution of Dukhobor Land in Ninotsminda Municipality 
As has already been outlined above, uncertainty over land rights in the village of Gorelovka 
has prompted the emigration of most of the remaining Dukhobors of Ninotsminda 
municipality over the last few years. The local land commission that redistributed land in 
Ninotsminda during the first wave of land privatization in the 1990s decided that no lands 
would be privatized in Gorelovka. Instead, the rights of management of the Dukhobor land in 
the village was handed over to an agricultural cooperative called Dukhoborets, which was 
never properly registered in the Entrepreneurial Registry. Although the then gamgebeli of 
Ninotsmida municipality signed a lease agreement with Dukhoborets in 2002, stating that 
Dukhoborets was leasing just over half the land of the former collective farm, the lease was 
not drawn up in accordance with the law and was therefore not legally valid.64 In 2005 when 
the Law on Privatization of Agricultural Land Owned by the State allowed the privatization 
of lands still owned and least by the state, the Dukhobor land was officially neither under 
public ownership nor leased by the state (given the invalidity of the earlier legal documents). 
While the law gave first priority for purchase to the person or persons currently leasing the 
land before the land was sold at auction (see above), it was unclear whether the flawed 
agreements signed by Dukhoborets gave the Dukhobors any rights at all. Moreover, the 
Dukhoborets co-operative legally inherited the debts of the old collective farm and therefore 
by law owed more than GEL 4 million (approx EUR 2 million) to the regional tax 
department (Lohm 2006). 
The situation was further complicated by the attitude of the authorities of the municipality 
and of the community sakrebulo, which from 2002 was controlled by a local Armenian 
 
61 Website of the Association for the Protection of Landowners' Rights, "Law of Georgia On Recognition of 
Title to the Lands Plots Possessed (Used) by Individuals and Legal Entities under Public Law last amended 
on 21 March 2008" at http://www.aplr.org/files/2/kquzze0x6.pdf. 
62 "Population of Tsalka Receives Land Plots For Free of Charge", Kvemo Kartli Independent Media (30 June 
2009), at http://www.cida.ge/media/eng/reginfo.php?id=2571. 
63 Interviews carried out by the author. 
64 It lacked a proper map delineating exactly what lands are leased, a proper signature of the Public Registrar 
and a registration number from the Public Registry (Lohm 2006). 
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closely connected to the main strategic economic group in Javakheti. It soon became clear 
that local power brokers were intent on nullifying the lease of the Dukhoborets co-operative 
and gaining control over most or all of the Dukhobor lands. When a local land commission 
was established to decide the fate of the Dukhobor cooperative, this commission was 
dominated by the leader of the community sakrebulo and his close associates. Of the 1,700 
hectares of land that the cooperative had originally leased, the Dukhobors were only allowed 
to keep 450 hectares. After a bad hay harvest in 2006, the Dukhobors were left without 
enough food to feed their cattle, prompting their decision to emigrate. This decision has led 
to a further struggle between local power brokers and the Georgian authorities over 
ownership of the land that the Dukhobors are abandoning and to a determination by local 
Armenians to prevent an inflow of Georgian ecological migrants (see above).65 
7. The View from Below 
 
So what is the view of the communities in Kvemo Kartli and Samtskhe-Javkheti about the 
way they are governed? In particular, how do minority communities perceive the majority 
Georgian population and the Georgian government? What are the main issues that engage 
them? These questions are especially relevant after the war between Georgia and Russia in 
August 2008 as it led to fears among the Georgian population that Russia would seek to 
exploit Georgia's minorities to further sow discord and split up the Georgian state. For the 
purposes of this paper I will focus on the two largest minorities in the two regions: the 
Armenians of Javakheti and the Azeris of Kvemo Kartli. 
The Armenians of Javakheti 
Probably the most important issue for the Armenians of Javakheti is the need to preserve the 
Armenian language and with it their Armenian identity. Most of the complaints and 
grievances articulated by Javakheti's Armenians relate to the fear that the majority population 
wants either to drive them out of the country or assimilate them and turn them into 
Georgians. For the Armenians―as for most of the peoples of the Caucasus―probably the 
most important identity marker is that of language. For this reason the Georgian 
government's initiative to ensure that members of national minorities know Georgian is seen 
not only as a measure to promote national integration, but by some also as a first step 
towards assimilation. For this reason, two recent measures introduced by the Georgian 
 
65 For a detailed description of the privatization process see Lohm (2006). 
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government have caused particular concern: the issue of strengthening the Georgian 
language in the education system and professional tests for state employees that include tests 
of employees' knowledge of Georgian. 
The most controversial measure regarding the use of Georgian in schools is the plan to 
ensure that history, geography and other social sciences be taught in Georgian by 2010 (see 
above). For Armenians, language and history are inextricably linked; if you do not know the 
history of your own people in your own language, you risk losing your identity as an 
Armenian. There is also the issue of the version of history that is being taught. All nations in 
the Caucasus have their own historical narratives that aim to assert the primacy of the nation 
over the territories they claim as theirs and these historical narratives are often incompatible 
with one another. The Armenians fear a “Georgianized” version of history will be taught, 
which is incompatible with their own historical narrative. 
The issue of professional testing in the Georgian language relates to the fear that the 
Georgian government is planning to dismiss all Armenian staff in local state structures and 
replace them with Georgians, using the language tests as a pretext. Armenian activists point 
to the fact that virtually all Armenian school directors in Javakheti failed tests in Georgian 
held in 2007 (see above) and now risk losing their jobs to Georgian competitors. They also 
point to similar language tests for other civil service professionals such as judges, policemen 
and notaries, which they claim will eventually be used to replace Armenians with Georgians 
and wrest away any leverage Armenians now have over running their own affairs. 
To protect the use of Armenian in public life, many local Armenians advocate making 
Armenian a local official language in those municipalities―such as Akhalkalaki and 
Ninotsminda―in which Armenians make up a majority. This demand has been articulated a 
number of times by nationalist organizations such as United Javakh, JEMM and Virk and a 
number of local NGOs.66 Some go further and call for Javakheti to be made an autonomous 
region within Georgia with its own directly elected assembly.67 However, the Georgian 
government rejects both ideas, arguing that to grant autonomy to Javakheti would risk the 
disintegration of the country, while giving any kind of official status to Armenian would 
undermine the process of national integration. 
 
66 Civil Georgia: Online Magazine (16th March 2006) at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12088; 
interviews with the author. 
67 Civil Georgia: Online Magazine (26th September 2005) at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=10827. 
 
 
 
 
48
 
In many respects the perceptions of threat articulated by Javakheti's Armenians are rather 
exaggerated. Given the still low levels of Georgian proficiency amongst local teachers, it is 
highly unlikely that the plans to teach history and geography in Georgian will come into 
effect as scheduled in 2010. Similarly the sweeping personnel changes that local Armenian 
activists feared would occur have not taken place. Only in Akhalkalaki municipal registry 
and in the local tax department have ethnic Georgians been appointed to senior positions. All 
the key posts in other local power structures of the two municipalities are held by Armenians, 
including the gamgeblebi, chiefs of police, prosecutor, the chief justice, one of the two 
notaries and almost all the staff of the sakrebulo and gamgeoba. While it is true that most 
Armenian school directors failed the professional tests and could not officially keep their 
positions, the vast majority stayed on as acting directors and will have a second chance to 
pass the tests in late 2009. 
Moreover, perceptions are changing amongst the local Armenian population. If five years 
ago, a majority of the population had little if any interest in learning Georgian, today most 
local Armenians deem it as necessary, even though many lament that the facilities required 
for the effective teaching of Georgian are insufficient. Similarly, demands for the full 
autonomy of Javakheti are less frequently heard these days and have gradually given way to 
calls to make Armenian a local official language. This may in part be due to the fact that the 
population feels less “neglected” as improvements to the local infrastructure have led to 
modest improvements in the quality of life and it may partly be due to a realization that 
given the recent hostilities with Russia, more radical demands such as full autonomy are 
unrealistic, especially as the Armenian government does not support such demands. 
Another existential fear of many Javakheti Armenians is that they are gradually being forced 
out of the country and that the demographic balance in Javakheti will be altered as Georgians 
and even Meskhetian Turks are encouraged to settle in the region. According to one wildly 
exaggerated rumour, the government was planning to settle some 60,000 Meskhetians in 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda municipalities alone. A more legitimate cause for concern is 
the exodus of educated people from Javakheti, especially to Yerevan, where most students go 
to university. Given the high level of competition for entry into Georgian universities and the 
built-in disadvantage faced by Armenian teenagers in the university entrance examinations 
due to their poor knowledge of Georgian, very few local Armenians are able to study in state-
accredited universities. An unwelcome development in this regard was the closure of the 
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Akhalkalaki branch of Tbilisi state university in 2007 after it was denied accreditation by the 
Ministry of Education and Science, leaving few opportunities for local Armenians to study in 
Georgia. Many young graduates from Javakheti, having studied in Yerevan, decide to remain 
there.  
The threat of a major demographic shift from Armenians to Georgians is, however, 
somewhat overstated. More than nine-tenths of the population of Javakheti remain 
Armenian. Although a few ecological migrants from other parts of Georgia have settled in 
Javakheti, their numbers are very small and most settled there in the late 1980s or early 
1990s. Even if some Georgians settle in Gorelovka after the departure of the Dukhobors―a 
prospect that has aroused anxiety amongst some Armenians―the number is likely to be 
small given the size of the settlement involved. Fears about the possible resettlement of 
Meskhetian Turks in Javakheti are also overstated; the government appears likely to restrict 
the number of Meskhetian Turks to a relatively small number per year and these are likely to 
be settled in villages of Akhaktsikhe, Adigeni and Aspindza municipalities from which they 
mostly were deported sixty-five years ago; very few are expected to arrive in Javakheti. 
Mutual suspicions between the Georgian population and government on the one hand, and 
Javakheti's Armenians on the other increased after the five-day war between Georgia and 
Russia over the breakaway region of South Ossetia in August 2008. The opinion of 
Javakheti's Armenians about the war was rather divided. The population of Javakheti have 
access to Georgian, Armenian and Russian television and were therefore presented with a 
range of opinions on the causes of the war. Initially, it would appear that the Russian version 
of events prevailed, as one of the main local television channels, ATV-12 in Akhalkalaki, 
which, along with Parvana TV in Ninotsminda, simultaneously translates Georgian news 
broadcasts into Armenian, had suspended broadcasting and only resumed its broadcasts on 
12th August. For this reason, initial reports by mass media about the “genocide” of the 
Ossetian population at the hands of Georgian forces tended to be believed. However, 
according to the above-mentioned survey carried out by ECMI, 74% of non-Georgians in 
Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda municipalities obtain access to news provided by local TV 
channels such as ATV-12―a similar proportion to those who access Armenian and Russian 
television news―and 18% access news provided by Adjara TV's Russian language 
broadcasts, which also provided the Georgian version of events. With time, therefore, as the 
local population was able to assimilate the often contradictory version of events, sympathies 
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began to shift towards the Georgian side. Interviews carried out by ECMI in Javakheti some 
two months after the war showed that the urban population seemed to be more critical of the 
Georgian government over the war than the rural population. 
The aftermath of the war ushered in a more hard-line policy by the Georgian law 
enforcement agencies and the arrests of a number of high-profile Armenian activists, which 
caused a degree of resentment and fear amongst the politically active sector of society. Local 
observers also noted that the local state security services were much more active into probing 
suspected cases of disloyalty to the Georgian state. The draconian ten-year sentence handed 
down to Chakhalyan (see above) for doing little more than organizing protest actions must be 
seen in this context. Many Armenian activists see the imprisonment of Chakhalyan as 
politically motivated and some even see the activities of the Belarussian NGO ALAP as an 
exercise that was staged by the Georgian security services to test the loyalty of local 
Armenians. At the same time, many are critical of Minasyan and Akopjanyan for damaging 
Georgian-Armenian relations.68 
One issue that has virtually dropped off the agenda of local activists is that of the 62nd 
Divisional Russian military base, which was dismantled in 2007. Despite protests before the 
withdrawal of the base that its removal would deprive the population of a much needed 
source of income and would leave Javakheti open to Turkish aggression, the response after 
its withdrawal was remarkably muted. Other issues involving Georgia's relationship with 
Russia and the west have become more salient. The first is that of Georgia's membership of 
NATO, as some of Javakheti's Armenians fear that a NATO base manned with Turkish troops 
may be deployed in Akhalkalaki. A second is the construction of the new Kars-Akhalkalaki-
Tbilisi-Baku (KATB) railway, which some local Armenian nationalists argue is a geopolitical 
project, the main aim of which is to isolate Armenia. There are also fears that Azeri and/or 
Turkish army units will be brought in to protect the railway and that guest workers will flood 
in from other parts of the country to help with the construction. 
If dealt with responsibly, neither of these issues is likely to lead to divisions in the long term. 
The issue of Georgia's membership of NATO, while salient in 2007 and the first half of 2008, 
is likely to be placed on the back burner for a while as NATO is now unlikely to offer 
Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the near future. Similarly if the construction of 
 
68 Interviews with the author. 
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KATB is managed well and jobs are provided for the local population in the construction, 
opposition to the plan is likely to fade away. Many leading Armenians are already supportive 
of the plan; the gamgebeli of Akhalkalaki and former United Javakh supporter Nair Iritsyan 
himself travelled to Kars and met local dignitaries to discuss plans for cross-border co-
operation with Turkey when he was mayor of Akhalkalaki in 2005. Many local residents 
were encouraged by promises by the administration of the KATB project that 70-75% of 
those employed in the construction of the railway will be local residents, although others 
remained rather more sceptical. 
The final set of concerns that exercise the minds of the local population are economic 
concerns. Indeed these concerns are considered more important than political issues for the 
rural population. Above all they relate to the continuing difficulty in making a living in 
Javakheti without sending a family member to Russia for seasonal work. Rural Armenians 
still rely primarily on subsistence agriculture in order to live and the market in Georgia for 
agricultural products from Javakheti, especially potatoes, is weak given the inflow of 
imported potatoes from Turkey, which makes it difficult for local producers to sell their 
potatoes in other parts of Georgia. Despite earlier promises that the Georgian armed forces 
would buy their potatoes from Javakheti after the withdrawal of the Russian military base, in 
2008 it was reported that the Georgian army was importing potatoes from Turkey, although 
army procurement officers returned to Akhalkalaki in February 2009, once again proposing 
to buy potatoes. Some sources report that the government has intervened to reduce the 
imports of potatoes from Turkey in response to a request by Nair Iritsyan, although it is not 
clear whether such a move would be feasible.69 Another major problem facing rural 
communities is a shortage of firewood, which is essential in Javakheti's harsh winters. 
Although the local population were given firewood vouchers after a promise made during the 
presidential election campaign during the winter of 2007-08, these vouchers proved useless 
as it was almost impossible to exchange them for firewood. Many local residents therefore 
thought that the provision of the vouchers was no more than an election ploy. 
The Azeris of Kvemo Kartli 
If political demands take centre stage amongst the active sector of the population in 
Javakheti, economic demands predominate in Kvemo Kartli. The issue of access to land has 
 
69 Source: interviews with the author. 
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been at the top of the agenda over recent years and despite some improvements in land 
distribution (see above), it remains a major concern for a large part of the Azeri population. 
Sub-letting of land to the local population at a profit by local latifundistas remains a problem 
and keeps some rural inhabitants close to the poverty line. Another major economic issue is 
that of the Sadakhlo bazaar, a market on the border with Armenia (and also close to the 
border with Azerbaijan) at which local Azeris used to trade before it was closed down in an 
anti-smuggling crackdown in December 2005. Stricter customs regulations also led to the 
closure of the Red Bridge market, just on the Azeri side of the border, in 2006. These two 
markets were a major source of income for much of the local population, especially Azeris 
(International Crisis Group 2006). Azeri activists complain that the Azeri population has 
been disproportionately targeted by the Georgian government's anti-corruption campaign and 
have been campaigning to reopen the Sadakhlo bazaar. In particular, they complain that 
Azeri residents in Kvemo Kartli are often forbidden to sell agricultural produce in the street, 
despite the fact that this practice is commonplace elsewhere in Georgia.70 
Another major problem for Kvemo Kartli's Azeri population is high unemployment. 
Although precise figures are not available, probably a majority of this population group is 
unemployed. In part this is a problem that affects all rural regions of Georgia, the recent 
economic boom (now over) that affected the capital, Tbilisi, left most rural districts of 
Georgia untouched. Amongst Kvemo Kartli's Azeris, however, the unemployment situation is 
particularly bad because of the few opportunities Azeris have to work for state structures, 
given the predominance of Georgian personnel, and because of the closure of markets such 
as Sadakhlo, where local Azeris used to trade. As in Javakheti, the lack of opportunities for 
young people has caused many to emigrate either to Baku or to Russia. 
Overall, the information vacuum is probably one of the biggest problems for Kvemo Kartli's 
Azeri population. One NGO leader in Marneuli complained that he has to travel to Tbilisi to 
find out what is going on in his own town.71 In comparison with the rest of Georgia―and 
even with Javakheti―local Azeris have access to far fewer sources of news than their 
counterparts elsewhere. According to the ECMI survey quoted above, the non-Georgian 
 
70 "Tolerance” Public Association for Human Rights Protection, Appendix to the alternative NGO report “On 
the implementation by Georgia of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 
the region of Kvemo Kartli” at 
http://tolerance.org.ge/en/monitoring_reports/files/appendix_FCNM_eng.pdf. 
71 Interview with the author. 
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population of Gardabani, Marneuli, and Dmanisi municipalities obtain access to news from 
an average of 0.95 domestic channels, compared with an average of 1.6 in Javakheti,72 
despite the fact that being closer to Tbilisi, Kvemo Kartli can receive more Georgian 
channels. Only 3.5% of non-Georgians in these three municipalities obtain news from local 
television channels, compared with 74% in Javakheti (see above). This is due to the dearth of 
local television channels in Kvemo Kartli that operate in the Azeri language; only the 
Bolnisi-based TV company “Channel 12” carries out a similar role to the local TV stations 
ATV-12 and Parvana in Javakheti by broadcasting Georgian news in the Azeri language, and 
its news coverage in Azeri appears to be limited to a weekly information programme.73 This 
lack of information on all issues of vital importance has led to a lack of awareness on matters 
of politics and governance, as is demonstrated by the survey finding (above) that most non-
Georgians do not even know what parties or blocs are standing in parliamentary elections. 
It is sometimes argued that Kvemo Kartli is less politically volatile than Javakheti because 
the Azeri population, being less well-informed about events, is less assertive in terms of 
articulating demands of a political nature. While this may be true, the lack of 
institutionalized channels through which the population can aggregate and articulate its 
interests may make spontaneous demonstrations of protest more, rather than less, likely. In 
2004 and 2005, a number of spontaneous protests over land distribution turned violent (see 
above), including the above-mentioned incident in which an elderly Azeri woman died 
(International Crisis Group 2006). 
The sense of isolation in Kvemo Kartli is particularly acute because there is often a lack of 
communication between the local authorities and the population. As the local power 
structures are dominated by Georgians (even in those municipalities in which Azeris make up 
an absolute majority) the language barrier often makes it difficult for local people to 
understand how the local administration works or to influence the way their municipality is 
run. Although Russian is generally used as a language of communication, often neither local 
residents nor the Georgian administrators speak and write Russian fluently and the local 
authorities often demand that written applications are filed in Georgian. In this respect the 
situation is more acute than in Javakheti, where the officials that local residents deal with on 
an everyday basis speak the same language. 
 
72 Significant at the 0.001 level of significance, using both Levene's test for equality of variances and the t-test 
for equality of means. 
73 See the company's website at http://tv12.ge/eng/programmes.html. 
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In political terms, the main demand of Azeri activists is for real representation in local state 
structures, which―as mentioned above―is more or less completely lacking at the present 
moment. Few Azeri activists call for full political autonomy of Azeri-speaking regions; the 
most radical step, supported by the NAAG, is to grant the Azeri language official status in 
Georgia. More mainstream groups such as the Congress of Georgian Azeris seek merely to 
promote the integration of the Azeri-speaking population into Georgian society and demand 
that the government take meaningful steps to facilitate this process, such as encouraging 
local Azeris to learn Georgian and work in the public sector. While in Javakheti local 
Armenians have been divided over the question of whether or not they need to learn 
Georgian, most Azeris would like to learn the state language but complain that they have too 
few opportunities to do so. The desire of Azeris to learn Georgian is especially strong 
because Kvemo Kartli is geographically very close to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and it 
would be far easier for the local population to travel to Tbilisi to work and study, rather than 
to faraway Baku. 
On cultural matters, one issue of great importance for the local intelligentsia is that of village 
toponyms. In the beginning of the 1990s a large number of villages that had previously been 
referred to using Azeri toponyms were renamed using Georgian toponyms. This occurred 
during the Gamsakhurdia period, when Georgian nationalist discourse was at its zenith. The 
public association Mtredi, a local NGO, has identified 31 villages in Bolnisi municipality the 
names of which were Georgianized during this period.74 Despite a number of appeals from 
local initiative groups to restore the old Azeri toponyms, no action has been taken by the 
government. This would appear to go against the spirit of the Council of Europe's 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), which entered 
into force in 2006. Article 11.3 of the FCNM states that “the Parties shall endeavour ... to 
display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for 
the public also in the minority language when there is a sufficient demand for such 
indications.” 
A final issue mentioned by Azeris in Bolnisi municipality is the alleged practice of erecting 
Christian crosses in Azeri villages. In late 2008, Azeri news sources reported that crosses had 
been erected in two villages in Bolnisi municipality on the initiative of the Georgian 
 
74 Public Association Mtredi, "Renewal of  toponymy as one of the real steps on reinstatement of interethnic 
dialog in Kvemo-Kartli region in Georgia" at 
http://www.minelres.lv/reports/georgia/PublicAssociationMtredi_Georgia_jan09_en.doc. 
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Patriarchy: Chapala (or Gonchulu in Azeri) and Kvemo Bolnisi (Kyapyanyakchi), but that 
the authorities had promised that such practices would not be repeated and the crosses were 
later taken down.75 However, in April 2009, local activists reported that a cross had also been 
erected in another Azeri village in the presence of local officials.76 They stressed that the 
Christian cross was a revered symbol for the moderate Muslims of Kvemo Kartli, but were 
aggrieved at what they felt was a deliberate attempt to provoke Muslim sensibilities. 
8. Conclusion 
 
The process of integrating Georgia's national minorities into Georgian society gained new 
momentum in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution in late 2003. By looking closely into the 
dynamics of state society relations in the regions in which the two most numerous national 
minorities―the Armenian and the Azeri minorities―are concentrated we can see that the 
integration process has had both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, 
the government has made a real effort to end the isolation of geographically concentrated 
minority communities, both by taking positive steps to improve the infrastructure―a case in 
point is the rehabilitation of roads and school buildings in Javakheti―and by making a 
genuine effort to improve proficiency in the Georgian language amongst remote minority 
communities. On the other hand, the government has done little to overcome the 
predominantly authoritarian dynamic that defines state-society relations in Kvemo Kartli and 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and has failed to introduce real methods of participatory democracy. In 
Javakheti, the government continues the policy of the Shevardnadze administration of co-
opting wealthy and influential members of the Armenian community to administer the region 
and supports efforts by this elite to undermine all public movements that threaten its 
continued hegemony. In Kvemo Kartli, the local Azeri community remains virtually 
unrepresented in local power structure. 
Given the complicated relationship with Russia, the Georgian government is rightly 
concerned that circles closely connected with the Russian government may exploit existing 
ethnic divisions to further undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia. In the aftermath of 
the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia it is not surprising that these potential 
 
75 Association for Civil Society Development in Azerbaijan News Portal, "Placing of crosses in Azerbaijani 
villages of Georgia suspended" (4 February 2009) at http://avciya.az/eng/2009/02/04/placing-of-crosses-in-
azerbaijani.html. 
76 Interviews with the author. 
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threats are taken seriously. However, the tendency to treat any grassroots movement 
organized by members of national minorities with suspicion may be counterproductive as it 
may encourage hitherto more moderate groups to adopt a radical stance. Similarly, while the 
increased presence of the state security forces in regions such as Tsalka in which the lack of 
state regulation earlier exacerbated conflict may be timely, in other regions the dominance of 
structures of law enforcement and state security may provoke fear and suspicion amongst 
minority communities. 
In the long run, minority communities will be encouraged to integrate into Georgian public 
life if there are real incentives to learn the state language and to continue to live and work in 
Georgia. This requires a sensitive approach that tackles a number of issues at the same time. 
First there is a need to provide effective and well-organized training in the Georgian 
language that adopts the most effective methodologies and operates in a realistic time frame. 
Second, it requires an education policy that encourages the most capable young people to 
remain in the country and study in Georgian institutions of higher education. Third it requires 
an economic policy that creates genuine job opportunities beyond the capital city that will 
benefit both rural Georgians and members of national minorities alike. Finally, it requires the 
establishment of genuinely democratic procedures at local level that allow members of 
national minorities to participate in the way they are governed. Recent efforts by the 
Georgian government to improve instruction in Georgian, to improve the rural infrastructure 
and to reform local self-government are welcome, but further steps in this direction need to 
be taken. 
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